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ABSTRACT
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) is currently one of the primary media to access the Internet.
Guaranteeing the availability of Wi-Fi networks is essential to numerous online activ-
ities, such as e-commerce, video streaming, and IoT services. Attacks on availability
are generally referred to as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. While there exists signif-
icant literature on DoS attacks against Wi-Fi networks, most of the existing attacks
are localized in nature, i.e., the attacker must be in the vicinity of the victim. The
purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the feasibility of mounting global DoS
attacks on Wi-Fi networks and develop effective counter-measures.
First, the dissertation unveils the existence of a vulnerability at the MAC layer
of Wi-Fi, which allows an adversary to remotely launch a Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack that propagates both in time and space. This vulnerability stems from a
coupling effect induced by hidden nodes. Cascading DoS attacks can congest an entire
network and do not require the adversary to violate any protocol. The dissertation
demonstrates the feasibility of such attacks through experiments with real Wi-Fi
cards, extensive ns-3 simulations, and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that
vii
the attack is effective both in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates,
as well as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain insight into the root-causes of
the attack, the network is modeled as a dynamical system and its limiting behavior is
analyzed. The model predicts that a phase transition (and hence a cascading attack)
is possible when the retry limit parameter of Wi-Fi is greater or equal to 7.
Next, the dissertation identifies a vulnerability at the physical layer of Wi-Fi that
allows an adversary to launch cascading attacks with weak interferers. This vulnera-
bility is induced by the state machine’s logic used for processing incoming packets. In
contrast to the previous attack, this attack is effective even when interference caused
by hidden nodes do not corrupt every packet transmission. The attack forces Wi-Fi
rate adaptation algorithms to operate at a low bit rate and significantly degrades
network performance, such as communication reliability and throughput.
Finally, the dissertation proposes, analyzes, and simulates a method to prevent
such attacks from occurring. The key idea is to optimize the duration of packet
transmissions. To achieve this goal, it is essential to properly model the impact of
MAC overhead, and in particular MAC timing parameters. A new theoretical model
is thus proposed, which relates the utilization of neighboring pairs of nodes using a
sequence of iterative equations and uses fixed point techniques to study the limiting
behavior of the sequence. The analysis shows how to optimally set the packet duration
so that, on the one hand, cascading DoS attacks are avoided and, on the other hand,
throughput is maximized. The analytical results are validated by extensive ns-3
simulations. A key insight obtained from the analysis and simulations is that IEEE
802.11 networks with relatively large MAC overhead are less susceptible to cascading
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Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) is a popular wireless technology that allows users to communi-
cate over the unlicensed 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz channel bands. Wi-Fi is widely used for
ubiquitous Internet access by a variety of organizations including schools, libraries,
companies, towns and governments, as well as ISP hotspots and residential wireless
routers. According to the statistics in Cisco Visual Networking Index 2017 (Cisco
Systems, Inc., 2017), 42% of the Internet traffic was transmitted through Wi-Fi in
2015 and this ratio is expected to increase to 49% by 2020. The total number of
Wi-Fi hotspots should grow six-fold from 2016 to 2021, from 94.0 million in 2016 to
541.6 million by 2021.
The widespread deployment of Wi-Fi networks increases the variety of services,
which include cellular offload, video/voice streaming, Wi-Fi phone, online banking
and so on. Indeed, Wi-Fi is the de-facto backbone communication technology for the
Internet-of-Things (IoT). The state-of-the-art IoT products, such as Apple HomePod,
Amazon Echo, and Google Home, rely on Wi-Fi for the communication. Therefore, it
is critical to ensure the security of Wi-Fi networks. The importance of Wi-Fi networks
and the need to strengthen their security have been recognized by companies, such
as Cisco (Cisco Systems, Inc., 2016).
Security guarantees are typically divided into three categories: confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. For the first two categories, IEEE 802.11 standard has
ratified the 802.11i standard (i.e., WPA2 or WPA3) (IEEE 802.11 Working Group and
2others, 2004) which has two versions: WPA-Personal for home networks and WPA-
Enterprise for enterprise networks. WPA-Personal uses a shared secret key (password)
between the access point and its clients for network authentication. WPA-Enterprise
employs RADIUS servers to handle client authentication instead of pre-shared key,
which effectively scales better to a large organization and makes key management
more secure.
Wi-Fi is vulnerable to availability attacks due to the shared-medium nature of
radio propagation (Zou et al., 2016). Violation of availability is generally referred to as
a denial of service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack makes a Wi-Fi network inaccessible to
its legitimate users, and may be launched by exploiting vulnerabilities at the physical
layer, MAC layer, or even higher layers of Wi-Fi networks.
The surveys (Bicakci and Tavli, 2009; Zou et al., 2016) list a variety of DoS attacks
on Wi-Fi networks and their counter-measures. For instance, attackers can exploit
vulnerabilities at the physical layer to launch attacks, such as preamble attack, SFD
attack (Gummadi et al., 2007), symbol attack (Lin and Noubir, 2005) and so on.
Their counter-measures are rapid frequency hopping, spatial retreat, and multi-hop
forwarding. Attacks at the MAC layer include deauthentication/disassociation attack,
duration inflation attack, and attacks against sleeping nodes (Bellardo and Savage,
2003). Counter-measured against those attacks include cryptographic protection.
So far, most existing DoS attacks localized, which means that the attacker and
the victim are within communication range. To our knowledge, only few works,
such as (Haenggi et al., 2009; Kong and Yeh, ), study DoS attacks from a global
perspective. On the other hand, radio attacks, such as jamming, are non-compliant
with Wi-Fi protocols. In this dissertation, we investigate DoS attacks which are
protocol-compliant and have impact on a global (multi-hop) Wi-Fi network.
The main goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the feasibility of launching global
3DoS attacks and propose counter-measures. The attacks proceed by exploiting cou-
pling mechanisms that are intrinsic to wireless networks, in general, and the Wi-Fi
protocol, in particular. Specifically, through experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, re-
alistic ns-3 simulation, and analysis, the attacks unveiled in this dissertation exploit
vulnerabilities at the MAC layer and the physical layer of the IEEE 802.11 standard.
We first unveil the existence of a vulnerability at the MAC layer of the IEEE
802.11 standard, which allows an attacker to launch protocol-compliant attacks that
congest a global Wi-Fi network. Indeed, Wi-Fi networks rely on a simple, distributed
mechanism, known as carrier sensing multiple access (CSMA), to arbitrate access
to the shared medium and optimize performance. The behavior of this mechanism
in isolated single-hop networks has been extensively studied and is generally well-
understood (see, e.g., (Bianchi, 2000)). However, due to interference coupling, this
mechanism results in complex interactions in multi-hop settings. As a consequence,
different networks do not always evolve independently, even if they are located far
away.
Figure 1·1 serves to illustrate this phenomenon at a high level. Suppose that
an attacker increases the rate at which it generates packets, and transmits these
packets in accordance with the IEEE 802.11 protocol. These transmissions may cause
packet collisions at nodes concurrently receiving packets from other sources. Due to
the infamous hidden node problem, which is hard to avoid in wireless networks,
transmitters may be unable to hear transmission by other nodes, even when using
CSMA, and hence keep retransmitting packets until they reach the so-called retry
limit of the back-off procedure. These retransmissions affect other neighbors and
may propagate.
The coupling phenomenon induced by interference creates multi-hop dependen-
cies, which an adversary can take advantage of the interference coupling to create
4Figure 1·1: Illustration of a cascading denial of service attack. Trans-
missions by an attacker impact nodes located far away, due to interfer-
ence coupling caused by hidden nodes.
multi-hop dependencies between different cells and launch a widespread network
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack from a single location. We refer to such an attack
as a cascading Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. Cascading DoS attacks are especially
dangerous because they affect the entire network and do not require the adversary to
violate any protocol (i.e., the attacks are protocol-compliant).
The main contributions of the first part of this dissertation are as follows:
1. We unveil the existence of a vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 standard, which
allows an attacker to launch protocol-compliant cascading DoS attacks. In
contrast to existing jamming attacks, the attacker does not need to be in the
vicinity of the victims.
2. We provide a concrete attack that exploits this vulnerability in certain net-
work scenarios. We demonstrate the attack through experiments on a testbed
composed of nodes equipped with real Wi-Fi cards, and through extensive ns-3
simulations.
3. We show the existence of a phase transition. When the packet generation rate
of the attacker is lower than the phase transition point, it has vanishing effect
5on the rest of the network. However, once the packet generation rate exceeds
the phase transition point, the network becomes entirely congested.
4. We develop a new analytical model that sheds light into the phase transition
observed in the simulations and experiments. The analysis predicts for which
values of the retry limit a phase transition (and hence a cascading attack) can
occur, and explicitly characterizes the phase transition region in terms of the
system parameters. In particular, we show that a phase transition can occur
for the default value of the retry limit in Wi-Fi, which is 7.
The attack described in the first part assumes that, at the receiver’s end, the power
of interference caused by a hidden node is stronger than the power of the signal of the
sending station (in other words, the signal-to-interference ratio is −10dB) such that
any overlap between transmissions of the station and the hidden node causes a loss
of the packet transmitted by the station irrespective of the bit rate. However, such
a disparity in the power strengths of the received signals may be rare in practice: in
effect, it means that either the hidden node transmits at a much higher power than
the station or that it is located much closer to the receiver. However, the attacker
controls only the first hidden node in the chain, but not other hidden nodes in the
network that help propagate the coupling effect.
In the second part of this dissertation, we investigate cases where interference
caused by hidden nodes is on the same order or weaker than the signals of send-
ing stations. Our main objective is to find out whether cascading attacks are still
feasible in those situations. Through extensive ns-3 simulations and mathematical
analysis, we provide an affirmative answer to this question. The attack leverages two
phenomena, which we describe in detail as follows.
The first phenomenon is a PHY-layer effect known as receiver capture (Jiang and
Liew, 2007). Accordingly, if the PHY header of the packet transmitted by the hidden
6node is decoded first, the packet sent by the station is lost (assuming the two packet
transmissions overlap). Thus, even though not all packets transmitted by the station
are lost, a large fraction still is.
The second phenomenon relates to bit rate adaptation. Specifically, rate adapta-
tion algorithms vary the bit rate used for packet transmissions based on the observed
quality of the channel. While different algorithms have been proposed in the lit-
erature (Biaz and Wu, 2008), most gradually lower the bit rate upon experiencing
packet losses. Since packet losses are still possible due the receiver capture effect, rate
adaption algorithms may end up significantly lowering the bit rate of Wi-Fi stations,
sometimes down to the base rate of 1 Mb/s. As a result, the capacity of the shared
channel is drastically reduced (since each packet transmission uses the shared channel
for a longer amount of time) leading to traffic congestion.
The main contributions of the second part of this dissertation can thus be sum-
marized as follows:
1. We identify and document a coupling effect between neighboring cells, due to
hidden nodes and receiver capture.
2. We analyze and provide simulations of the packet loss probability with and
without receiver capture. We show that with receiver capture, a packet sent by
a station is lost irrespective of the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) and the bit
rate.
3. Leveraging the above coupling effect, we demonstrate the feasibility of launch-
ing cascading attacks on Wi-Fi networks using weak hidden nodes (i.e., hidden
nodes producing weak interference). Through extensive ns-3 simulations, in-
cluding for an indoor building model, we show that the coupling effect may
propagate, thus reducing the channel capacity across an entire chain of Wi-Fi
cells. These results apply to several rate adaptation algorithms.
74. We provide an analysis of the limiting behavior of the channel utilization in a
chain of Wi-Fi cells, assuming nodes implement the Auto Rate Fallback (ARF)
rate adaptation algorithm (Kamerman and Monteban, 1997). In particular,
we show how the average bit rate experiences a sharp drop as the channel
utilization gets higher, which provides insight into how the attack is able to
propagate throughout the network.
Given the serious consequences of cascading DoS attacks, it is important to find
methods to mitigate them. While an optional mechanism, called RTS/CTS, has been
designed to combat the hidden node problem, it increases overhead and latency es-
pecially at high bit rates. Since the cost of the RTS/CTS exchange usually does not
justify its benefits, it is commonly disabled (Forouzan Behrouz, 2004; Gast, 2005).
Indeed, most manufacturers of Wi-Fi cards disable RTS/CTS by default and dis-
courage changing this setting as explicitly stated in (Netgear, 2016; TP-Link, 2016;
Linksys, 2016; D-link, 2016). Therefore, most Wi-Fi systems today operate without
RTS/CTS. Therefore, it is necessary to design mitigation other than RTS/CTS.
In the third part of this dissertation, we focus on the mitigation of cascading
DoS attacks in Wi-Fi networks. Our key idea is to optimize the duration of packet
transmissions (or, equivalently, the packet length divided by the bit rate) in order to
ensure that interference coupling does not propagate and amplify. To achieve this
goal, we show that it is essential to properly model the impact of MAC overhead,
and in particular MAC timing parameters. We propose a refined theoretical model
where we relate the utilization of nodes in neighboring cells using iterative equations.
We then perform a fixed point analysis to characterize the limiting behavior of the
sequence of node utilization and the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS network
against a Wi-Fi network.
Our contributions to the mitigation of cascading DoS attacks are listed as follows:
81. We show how to set the packet duration in order to avoid a cascading DoS
attack, namely to prevent the initial value of the sequence of node utilization
(which can be set by the attacker) to affect the limit of the sequence.
2. We show that it is possible to simultaneously optimize the packet duration in
order to achieve maximum throughput.
3. We validate the analytical results using ns-3 simulations, including for an office
building model. A key insight obtained from our analysis and simulation is that
IEEE 802.11 networks with relatively large MAC overhead (e.g., IEEE 802.11b)
are less susceptible to cascading DoS attacks than networks with smaller over-
head (e.g., IEEE 802.11g and IEEE 802.11n). We also show that our method
achieves higher throughput performance than the RTS/CTS method, especially
at high bit rates.
To summarize, in this dissertation,
• We unveil the existence of a vulnerability at the MAC layer of the IEEE 802.11
standard, which an adversary can take advantage of to launch a cascading DoS
attack. The vulnerability stems from a coupling effect induced by hidden nodes.
We first consider the scenario with strongly interfering hidden nodes, i.e., when
any collision between transmissions of the station and the hidden node causes
a loss of the packet transmitted by the station. We demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of such attacks through experiments with real Wi-Fi cards, extensive ns-3
simulations, and theoretical analysis. The simulations show that the attack is
effective both in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as well
as ad hoc and infrastructure modes. To gain insight into the root-causes of the
attack, we model the network as a dynamical system and analyze its limiting
behavior and stability.
9• We investigate the feasibility of cascading DoS attacks with weakly interfer-
ing hidden nodes. Through extensive ns-3 simulations, including for an indoor
building model, we show that cascading DoS attacks are still feasible. The at-
tacks leverage two PHY-layer phenomena: receiver capture and bit rate adapta-
tion. We provide supporting analysis for these phenomena and also investigate
the limiting behavior of the channel utilization in a chain of Wi-Fi cells, assum-
ing nodes implement the Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) rate adaptation algorithm.
Our analysis sheds light into a coupling effect, whereby the average bit rate of
a transmission pair drops sharply as the channel utilization of a neighboring
pair gets higher. This coupling effect facilitates the propagation of the attack
throughout the network.
• We provide a counter-measure against the occurrence of cascading DoS attacks.
Our key idea is to optimize the duration of packet transmissions. To achieve this
goal, we show that it is essential to properly model the impact of MAC overhead,
and in particular MAC timing parameters. We propose a new theoretical model
where we relate the utilization of neighboring pairs of nodes using a sequence of
iterative equations and use fixed point techniques to study the limiting behavior
of the sequence.
This dissertation has six chapters. The present chapter is Chapter 1. In Chap-
ter 2, we present background and work related to this dissertation. In Chapter 3, we
demonstrate the feasibility of cascading DoS attacks on Wi-Fi networks with strong
interferers and investigate sufficient conditions to launch the attack. In Chapter 4,
we investigate feasibility of the attacks in cases where interference caused by hid-
den nodes is on the same order or weaker than the signals of sending stations. In
Chapter 5, we introduce, analyze, and experiment with a method for cascading DoS
attacks in Wi-Fi networks. We conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter, we provide background and discuss work related to this dissertation.
We first provide background on key aspects of IEEE 802.11 standard. In particular, we
review the details of carrier sensing multiple access (CSMA), physical layer reception,
cyclic redundancy check, and rate adaptation, whose vulnerabilities are exploited to
launch the cascading attacks.
We then review the hidden node problem in Wi-Fi networks. Hidden nodes induce
an interference coupling phenomenon that the cascading attacks leverage. We next
describe the receiver capture effect which represents another vulnerability of Wi-Fi
networks that can be exploited for the purpose of launching a cascading attack.
Next, we review prior work on DoS attacks in Wi-Fi networks. We review lit-
erature work on interference coupling, phase transitions, capture phenomena, and
the impact of MAC timings, all of which play an important role in determining the
feasibility of cascading DoS attacks.
Finally, we summarize the limitations of prior work and highlight on our new
contributions.
2.1 IEEE 802.11 protocol
Wi-Fi is a wireless local area network (WLAN) technology, which mainly runs on
2.4 GHz ISM bands and 5 GHz bands (Gast, 2005). The IEEE 802.11 standard
is a series of specifications, such as the media access control (MAC) and physical
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layer (PHY) interfaces. The first 802.11 standard that gained widespread success
is 802.11b. It runs on the 2.4 GHz band and supports 4 bit rates (1, 2, 5.5, 11
Mb/s). The subsequent standards (e.g., 802.11a, g, n, and ac) support higher bit
rates using higher order modulation along with coding, OFDM, MIMO, and wider
bands. It is noteworthy that 802.11b is the only mode that supports communication
at 1 Mb/s. Hence, when the bit rate reduces to 1 Mb/s, Wi-Fi network reverts to
the 802.11b mode. Generally, this lower bit rate has higher resistance to interference
during transmission and is able to operate over lower SNR channels.
2.1.1 Carrier-sense multiple access
The IEEE 802.11 standard uses the CSMA/CA mechanism to control access to the
transmission medium and avoid collisions. After a packet is sent, a node waits for a
short interframe slots (SIFS) period to receive an ACK. Whenever the channel be-
comes idle, the node waits for a distributed interframe space (DIFS > SIFS) period
and a random backoff before contending for the channel. The random backoff consists
of a random number of backoff slots, which depends on the so-called contention win-
dow. Specifically, at the r ≥ 1 retransmission attempt (retry count), the contention
window CWr is given by
CWr =
{
2r−1(CW1 + 1)− 1 CWr < CWmax,
CWmax otherwise.
(2.1)
The number of backoff slots is chosen uniformly at random in the interval [0, CWr].
For IEEE 802.11b, the initial contention window size is CW1 = 31 , the maximum
contention window size is CWmax = 1023, and the duration of a backoff slot is 20 µs.
Note that the case r = 1 corresponds to the initial packet transmission attempt.
The number of backoff slots is an element of the set {0, 1, . . . , CWr} chosen uni-
formly at random. We denote the duration of a backoff slot by Tslot. The average
12




CWr · Tslot. (2.2)
After sending a packet, a node waits for a short interframe space (SIFS) period
before expecting to receive an ACK. If the ACK is received (i.e., the transmission is
successful), then the average duration of the MAC overhead at the rth retransmission
attempt is
d(s)r = TDIFS + T backoff,r + TSIFS + TACK, (2.3)
where TDIFS and TSIFS represent respectively the durations of the DIFS and SIFS
intervals and TACK represents the duration of an ACK transmission.
If a node does not receive an ACK within an ACK timeout period (e.g., due to a
collision caused by a hidden node), then it increments r and repeats the procedure.
Thus, if a transmission fails, the average duration of the MAC overhead at the rth
retransmission attempt is
d(f)r = TDIFS + T backoff,r + TACK timeout, (2.4)
where TACK timeout is the duration of the ACK timeout interval. This process continues
as long as the number of retransmissions r does not exceed the (short) retry limit R.
Once this limit is exceeded, the packet is dropped, r is reset to 1, and the transmission
of a new packet can start. In all our analysis and simulations, we use the default value
of the retry limit, namely R = 7 (Riley and Henderson, 2010).
The IEEE 802.11 standard has several variants, which differ in their physical
and MAC layer specifications (Intel, 2017). These variants support transmissions at
different bit rates going up to 11 Mb/s for IEEE 802.11b, 54 Mb/s for IEEE 802.11g,
and 600 Mb/s (theoretically) for IEEE 802.11n. In practice, IEEE 802.11n networks
often operate with bit rates going up to 54 Mb/s (Intel, 2017).
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TDIFS (µs) 50 28
TSIFS (µs) 10 10
Tslot (µs) 20 9 or 20
Table 2.1 shows settings of the timing parameters of IEEE 802.1b and IEEE
802.11g/n that are relevant to this dissertation. Note that IEEE 802.11g/n networks
can use either a long slot time (i.e., Tslot = 20 µs) or a short slot time (i.e., Tslot = 9 µs)
(ns-3, 2018). The long slot time is typically used in a mixed environment composed
of both 802.11b and 802.11g/n nodes.
2.1.2 Physical layer reception
IEEE 802.11 uses the Physical Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) to implement
physical layer functionalities (IEEE Standards Association and others, 2012). The
format of a packet at the physical layer is shown in Figure 2·1, and consists of a
PLCP preamble, a PLCP header and data (payload). The PLCP preamble consists
of a synchronization pattern (SYNC) and a start frame delimiter (SFD) to indicate
the start of a packet. The PLCP header, which follows the PLCP preamble, contains
radio information about the packet, such as the bit rate (RATE) and the packet length
(LENGTH). The last part of the packet is the data (payload) which corresponds to
the MAC frame.
When a receiver processes packets at the physical layer, it transits between two
PLCP states, the Carrier Sense/Clear Channel Assessment (CS/CCA) state and the
Receive (Rx) state1. The transitions between those states are illustrated in Figure 2·2.
In the CS/CCA state, the receiver monitors the state of the channel. Once it detects a














valid PLCP preamble & header received 
Reception ends after packet duration
Figure 2·2: Transitions of the PLCP state-machine upon receiving a
packet.
valid PLCP preamble and header, it moves to the Rx state and processes the payload
using information provided in the PLCP header. In particular, using packet length
information, the receiver stays in the Rx state until the last bit of the packet is
presumably received. Regardless of whether the payload is correctly received or not,
the reception ends at that point and the receiver moves back to the CS/CCA state.
2.1.3 Cyclic redundancy check
A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is a coding algorithm that detects errors in a packet.
In the IEEE 802.11 standard, the CRC field corresponds to the last 32 bits of the
MAC frame. When a PHY packet is received, the physical layer forwards the MAC
frame to the MAC layer. The MAC layer checks the integrity of the MAC frame using
the 32-bit CRC code. If the MAC frame is damaged, then the frame is discarded.
2.1.4 Rate adaptation
The IEEE standard leaves it to the implementer to determines the bit rate for each
packet. Accordingly, many rate adaptation algorithms have been proposed in the liter-
ature. Several of them such as ARF (Kamerman and Monteban, 1997), Onoe (Project,
2018), and AMRR (Lacage et al., 2004) react to the occurrence of packet losses or
lack thereof. If packet losses occur, the algorithms lower the bit rate, while if no
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packet loss occurs, they raise the bit rate.
ARF
We next explain the operations of ARF in more detail, since we theoretically analyze
its performance in the sequel. In ARF, packets can be transmitted at N different
bit rates, denoted by b1, b2, . . . , bN (e.g., N = 12 for IEEE 802.11b/g). The bit rates
are sorted from the lowest to the highest. That is, bj < bj+1. ARF changes the bit
rate when a certain number of consecutive packets are either transmitted successfully
or lost. Specifically, if s consecutive packets are transmitted successfully and the
current bit rate bj is lower than bN , then ARF raises its bit rate from bj to bj+1. If
f consecutive packets are lost and bj is higher than b1, then ARF lowers the bit rate
from bj to bj−1. By default, s = 10 and f = 2 (Lacage et al., 2004).
Minstrel
Minstrel is a practical, state-of-the-art rate adaptation algorithm that has been im-
plemented within the MadWiFi project and Linux mac80211 driver framework (Berg,
2016). It chooses the bit rate of a transmission based on the throughput measured
over past transmissions at different rates. Technically, it selects a bit rate following a
retry chain, as shown in Table 2.2.
In Minstrel, 90% of the packets are transmitted at a “normal rate” (fourth column
in Table 2.2). The remaining 10% are transmitted at a “lookaround rate” (second
and third columns in Table 2.2). Each packet is transmitted at a rate following a
retry chain (rows in Table 2.2). For example, consider a packet being transmitted at
“lookaround rate”. If a random rate is lower than the rate with “best throughput”,
the packet is first transmitted at the “best throughput” rate, then at the “random
rate”, then at the “best probability” rate, and finally at the “lowest baserate”. The
packet is dropped if the transmission fails at the “lowest baserate”. The retry chain
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Table 2.2: Minstrel Retry Chain (Berg, 2016)
Try Lookaround rate Normal rate
random < best2 random > best
1 Best throughput Random rate Best throughput
2 Random rate Best throughput 2nd best throughput
3 Best probability3 Best probability Best probability
4 Lowest baserate Lowest baserate Lowest baserate
table is updated 10 times every second based on performance statistics.
Therefore, a large amount of packet loss does not necessarily cause Minstrel to
switch to a low bit rate. Another advantage of Minstrel is that it probes the through-
put of different bit rates randomly. This makes the rate adaptation more robust in
complicated environment and against some adversaries.
2.2 Hidden node problem
A typical instance of the hidden node problem is illustrated in Figure 2·3. The figure
shows three nodes: a transmitter, a receiver and a hidden node. The dashed circle
represents the transmission range of the node. Since the transmitter and the hidden
node cannot sense each other, a collision happens when both of them transmit packets
at the same time.
A packet collision triggers a retransmission. In IEEE 802.11, there is an upper
limit on the number of retransmissions that a packet can incur, called retry limit and
denoted by R (the default value is R = 7). If the retry count r of a packet exceeds
the retry limit, the packet is dropped, the retry count is reset to r = 1, and a new
packet transmission can start. The channel utilization of a node increases with the
probability of a packet collision. In the worst case, the utilization can be R times
larger than in the absence of packet collisions. Therefore, the access channel of a
node can easily be congested if it is forced to retransmit packets.
The hidden node problem can in principle be avoided by enabling the RTS/CTS





Figure 2·3: Classical hidden node problem. The transmitter and the
hidden node cannot sense each other. The collision happens when they
transmit simultaneously.
change has not only high overhead, but also does not always fully prevent packet col-
lisions (Ray et al., 2005a) and may lead to deadlocks in multi-hop configurations (Ray
and Starobinski, 2007). Generally, it is either turned off (Bellardo and Savage, 2003)
or only used for packets whose length exceeds the so-called RTS threshold. Most
manufacturers of Wi-Fi cards, including Netgear (Netgear, 2016), TP-LINK (TP-
Link, 2016), Linksys (Linksys, 2016) and D-Link (D-link, 2016), disable RTS/CTS
altogether by setting the RTS threshold to a sufficiently high default value (e.g.,
2346 bytes, which corresponds to the maximum length of an IEEE 802.11 frame).
They furthermore recommend to not change the default setting.
2.3 Receiver capture effect
Since the PLCP header only contains radio information, the address of the intended
receiver of a packet is unknown until it is checked by the MAC layer. Thus, at
the physical layer, a node processes any packet heard from the air. Once the node
detects a valid PLCP preamble and header, it moves from the CS/CCA to the Rx
state. Therefore, the node cannot detect the PLCP preamble and header of other
packets (including those destined to itself) until the current packet reception ends.
This phenomenon is known as the receiver capture effect (Jiang and Liew, 2007).
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2.4 Related work
2.4.1 Denial of service attacks
In general, the main goal of a DoS attack is to make communication impossible
for legitimate users. Within the context of wireless networks, a simple and popular
means to launch a DoS attack is to jam the network with high power transmissions of
random bits, hence creating interferences and congestion. Jamming at the physical
layer, together with anti-jamming countermeasures, have been extensively studied
(cf. (Poisel, 2011) for a monograph on this subject).
More recently, several works have developed and demonstrated smart jamming
attacks. These attacks exploit protocol vulnerabilities across various layers in the
stack to achieve high jamming gain and energy efficiency, and a low probability of
detection (Pelechrinis et al., 2011). For instance, (Lin and Noubir, 2005) shows that
the energy consumption of a smart jamming attack can be four orders of magnitude
lower than continuous jamming. The works in (Noubir et al., 2011; Orakcal and
Starobinski, 2014) show that several Wi-Fi bit rate adaptation algorithms, such as
SampleRate, ONOE, AMRR, and RARF, are vulnerable to smart jamming. However,
both conventional and smart jamming attacks are usually non-protocol compliant.
Moreover, they require physical proximity. These limitations can be used to identify
and locate the jammer.
In contrast, in this thesis we show how a protocol-compliant DoS attack can be
remotely launched by exploiting coupling due to hidden nodes in Wi-Fi. Rate adap-
tation algorithms further amplify this attack due to their inability to distinguish
between collisions, interferences, and poor channels. One potential mitigation is to
design a rate adaptation algorithm whose behaviour is based on the observed inter-
ference patterns (Chen et al., 2007; Rayanchu et al., ). However, to the best of our
knowledge, none of these rate adaptation algorithms are used in practice.
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2.4.2 Interference coupling
Interference coupling caused by hidden nodes is studied by (Chen et al., 2007; Ray
et al., 2005b; Broustis et al., 2007), though none of these works consider security
ramifications. The work in (Chen et al., 2007) shows that coupling causes nodes to
transmit at low bit rates, thus aggravating packet losses. The work in (Ray et al.,
2005b) conducts a queuing-theoretic analysis of a chain of neighboring cells with
hidden nodes. The analysis reveals that the impact of hidden nodes propagates
through the network, causing some nodes to congest at load as low as 15% of the
capacity.
The work in (Broustis et al., 2007) perform measurements of a multi-cell IEEE
802.11 network in an indoor testbed. The experiments clearly shows the existence
of hidden nodes and the effects of interference coupling in a real world setting. The
experimental results also show that hidden nodes cause fairness issues. These fair-
ness issues as well as throughput performance of the network get even worse when
RTS/CTS is enabled. Other drawbacks of the RTS/CTS procedure are discussed
in (Ray et al., 2003; Xu et al., 2003).
2.4.3 Phase transition
The attacks that we are investigating bear similarity to cascading failures in power
transmission systems (Kinney et al., 2005; Soltan et al., 2014). When one of the
nodes in the system fails, it shifts its load to adjacent nodes. These nodes in turn can
be overloaded and shift their load further. This phenomenon has also been studied in
wireless networks. For instance, (Haenggi et al., 2009; Kong and Yeh, ) model wireless
networks as a random geometric graph topology generated by a Poisson point process.
They use percolation theory to show that the redistribution of load induces a phase
transition in the network connectivity. However, the cascading phenomenon that
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we investigate in this dissertation is different from cascading failure studied in those
works. In our work, the exogenous generation of traffic at each node is independent.
That is, a node will not shift its load to other nodes. The amount of traffic measured
on the channel increases due to packet retransmissions caused by packet collisions,
rather than due to traffic redistribution.
The work in (Aziz et al., 2009; Aziz et al., 2011) show that interference coupling
can affect the stability of multi-hop networks. In the case of a greedy source, a three-
hop network is stable while a four-hop network becomes unstable. In contrast, in our
work, the path of each packet consists of a single-hop. Thus, network instability is
not due to multi-hop communication in our case.
The work in (Ray et al., 2005b; Saligrama and Starobinski, 2006) show that local
coupling due to interferences can have global effects on wireless networks. Thus, (Ray
et al., 2005b) proposes a queuing-theoretic analysis and approximation to predict the
probability of a packet collision in a multi-hop network with hidden nodes. It shows
that the sequence of the packet collision probabilities in a linear network converges
to a fixed point. The work in (Saligrama and Starobinski, 2006) evaluates the impact
of rate adaption and finds out that traffic increase at a single node can congest an
entire network, and points out the existence of a phase transition.
2.4.4 Physical capture phenomenon
We next explain the differences between the well-known capture effect and the lesser
known receiver’s capture effect, which is the focus of our work. The capture effect
pertains to the fact that two overlapping transmissions may not necessarily result in
a packet loss. Specifically, if the power of a detected packet exceeds the combined
power of interfering signals beyond a certain threshold, then that packet can still
be decoded successfully. In Wi-Fi networks, this effect occurs only when the packet
with the strongest power is received before others. That is, the packet with the
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highest power is transmitted first. The works in (Durvy et al., 2007; Hadzi-Velkov
and Spasenovski, 2003; Li and Zeng, 2006; Nyandoro et al., 2007; Daneshgaran et al.,
2008) provide models of Wi-Fi networks integrating the capture effect and show that
the packet loss probability can be significantly lower than in models that ignore the
capture effect, e.g., Bianchi’s Markov model (Bianchi, 2000).
Under the receiver capture effect (Jiang and Liew, 2007), a receiver aligns its
state machine with information provided by the PHY header of the first transmission,
before the second packet arrives. We stress that the receiver does not need be the
intended recipient of the first transmission (because there is no destination address in
the PHY header). Under the receiver capture effect, the second transmission (which
may be a packet destined to the receiver) cannot be properly decoded and this packet
is lost. Note that such a scenario occurs in network configurations where hidden nodes
are present, but not in configurations where nodes can all hear each other (Jiang and
Liew, 2007). Modern simulators, such as ns-3, take the receiver capture effect into
account in their physical layer models. In this work, we show how an adversary can
exploit the receiver capture effect to launch a cascading attacks on a Wi-Fi network.
2.4.5 Effect of MAC timings
The effect of MAC timing parameters on the performance of IEEE 802.11 networks has
been extensively studied in the literature (Bianchi, 2000; Cal`ı et al., 2000; Magistretti
et al., 2011; Sun and Dai, 2015; Kumar et al., 2007; Dai and Sun, 2013; Foh and
Tantra, 2005; Duda et al., 2008). In particular, an analysis carried out in (Duda
et al., 2008) shows that in the absence of contention between nodes, MAC overhead
significantly affects throughput, especially at high bit rates. In contrast to those
works, the focus of our work is to assess the impact of the MAC overhead on the
feasibility of launching a cascading DoS attack. Interestingly, we show that a larger




After reviewing the related work, we summarize our findings as follows:
• A DoS attack aims to make communication impossible for legitimate users. It
can be launched by creating high power interference or by exploiting protocol
vulnerabilities across various layers in the stack to achieve high gain and energy
efficiency. However, most of those attacks require physical proximity and are
usually non-protocol complaint. These limitations can be used to identify and
locate the attacker. In contrast, in this dissertation we show how a protocol-
compliant DoS attack can be remotely launched by exploiting coupling due to
hidden nodes.
• Wi-Fi supports the RTS/CTS mechanism to solve the hidden node problem.
However, RTS/CTS causes fairness issues and degrades throughput perfor-
mance in many scenarios. Therefore, most Wi-Fi systems today operate without
RTS/CTS and hidden nodes are still present.
• There exist two capture phenomena at the physical layer of Wi-Fi. One is
the well-known capture effect, which pertains to the fact that two overlapping
transmissions may not necessarily result in a packet loss. The other one is the
so-called receiver capture effect, under which a receiver aligns its state machine
with information provided by the PHY header of the first transmission, before
the second packet arrives.
• The MAC timing parameter settings in IEEE 802.11 networks have a high
impact on throughput performance, especially at high bit rates.
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This dissertation explore the security issues associated with these cross-layer phe-
nomena in Wi-Fi and demonstrate a new type of DoS attack, which is protocol-
compliant and can be remotely launched. Our work differs in several aspects from
previous work in the literature. First, it considers an adversarial context, and shows
how interference-induced coupling can be exploited to cause denial of service. Second,
to our knowledge, it is the first work to demonstrate the existence of such coupling on
real commodity hardware. Third, our simulations are based on a high-fidelity wire-
less simulator (ns-3), capable of capturing the effects of rate adaptation algorithms
and accurately modeling infrastructure networks. Finally, our analytical models are
original and capture the impact of the retry limit and traffic parameters. A key result
is that a cascading attack can be launched for the default value of the retry limit in
Wi-Fi, a result validated by the experiments and simulations.
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Chapter 3
Cascading Attacks with Strong Interferers
3.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we demonstrate cascading DoS attacks on Wi-Fi networks and inves-
tigate sufficient conditions to launch such attacks. Toward that end, we consider a
network with a strong coupling effect between neighboring Wi-Fi cells. As described
in Chapter 1, the attack is due to an interference coupling effect caused by hidden
nodes. We consider strong hidden nodes, whereby interference due to a hidden node
destroys all the ongoing transmissions within its communication range, hence creating
strong coupling between neighboring Wi-Fi network cells.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, we unveil the existence
of a vulnerability in the IEEE 802.11 standard, which allows an attacker to launch
protocol-compliant cascading DoS attacks. In contrast to existing jamming attacks,
the attacker does not need to be in the vicinity of the victims.
Second, we provide a concrete attack that exploits this vulnerability in certain
network scenarios. We demonstrate the attack through experiments on a testbed
composed of nodes equipped with real Wi-Fi cards, and through extensive ns-3 sim-
ulations.
Third, we show the existence of a phase transition. When the packet generation
rate of the attacker is lower than the phase transition point, it has vanishing effect
on the rest of the network. However, once the packet generation rate exceeds the
phase transition point, the network becomes entirely congested. Thus, under a phase
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transition, the utilization of a remote node experiences no change until it is suddenly
forced to congestion (Saligrama and Starobinski, 2006).
Finally, we introduce a new analytical model that sheds light into the phase tran-
sition observed in the simulations and experiments. We apply fixed point theorems
to this model. The analysis predicts for which values of the retry limit a phase transi-
tion (and hence a cascading attack) can occur, and explicitly characterizes the phase
transition region in terms of the system parameters. In particular, we show that a
phase transition can occur for the default value of the retry limit in Wi-Fi, which is 7.
We carry out a stability analysis and demonstrate that in the phase transition region
the system must have multiple fixed points, one of which being unstable.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the
attack scenario to investigate the feasibility of the attack. We present and discuss
experimental and simulation results in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present an
analytical model that explains the behaviour of the network and the impact of various
parameters, and compare the analytical and simulation results. In Section 3.5, we
summarize the chapter and discuss possible mitigation methods.
3.2 Attack Scenario
We first explain how a cascading DoS attack can unfold. We consider a network
configuration consisting of a chain of N pairs of nodes. Figure 3·1 depicts the con-
figuration. The ith pair is denoted (Ai, Bi), where i ≥ 0. Each node Ai transmits
packets to node Bi (one-hop communication). Furthermore, each node Ai is a hidden
node with respect to node Ai+1, which means that node Ai cannot sense a transmis-
sion by node Ai+1. Here, we assume that the hidden node is always strong, i.e., if a
transmission by node Ai overlaps with a transmission by node Ai+1, a packet collision
occurs at node Bi+1. This collision forces node Ai+1 to retransmit its packet using
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Figure 3·1: Network configuration. The dotted circles represent the
communication range of nodes Ai. Nodes Ai transmit packets to nodes
Bi (i = 0, 1, . . .). Each transmission pair (Ai, Bi) belongs to a different
cell. Nodes Ai are hidden nodes with respect to nodes Ai+1.
the procedure described in Section 2.1.1.
In this configuration, suppose node A0 (the attacker) starts increasing the rate at
which it generates packets and transmits them over the channel (in compliance with
the IEEE 802.11 standard). These transmissions will cause collisions at node B1,
which forces node A1 to increase the rate at which it attempts to transmit packets over
the channel (due to retransmissions). The increased rate of transmission attempts by
A1 will in turn impact pair (A2, B2) and so forth. Under certain conditions, this effect
may amplify along the chain and cause a large fraction of transmission attempts to fail
and result in unstable queues (i.e., the rate at which nodes can successfully transmit
packets over the channel is lower than the rate at which packets are generated).
3.3 Experimental and Simulation Results
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching cascading DoS attacks
both through experiments and simulations. We first show results on an experimental
testbed using real Wi-Fi cards. We then use ns-3.22 simulations to investigate how
this attack can be performed in significantly larger scale networks, and under different









Figure 3·2: Experimental testbed.
3.3.1 Experiments
We set up an experimental testbed composed of six nodes. The testbed configuration
is shown in Figure 3·2. We establish an IEEE 802.11n ad hoc network consisting
of three pairs of nodes. Each node consists of a PC and a TP-LINK TL-WN722N
Wireless USB Adapter. We use RF cables and splitters to link the nodes, isolate
them from external traffic, and obtain reproducible results.
We place 70 dB attenuators on links between node Ai and Bi (i ∈ 0, 1, 2), and
60 dB attenuators on links between nodes Ai and Bi+1. The difference in the sig-
nal attenuation of different links ensures that a packet loss occurs if a hidden node
transmits. In practice, such a situation may occur if nodes Ai and Bi+1 communicate
without obstacles, while node Ai and Bi are separated by an office wall (Stein, 1998).
The transmission power of each node is set to 0 dBm. We use iPerf to generate UDP
data streams and to measure the throughput achieved on each node. The length of a
packet is the default IP packet size of 1500 bytes.
Figure 3·3 demonstrates the cascading DoS attack on the experimental testbed.
At first, the packet generation rates of nodes A0, A1 and A2 are set to 400 Kb/s.
We observe that the throughput of all the nodes remains in the vicinity of 400 Kb/s
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Figure 3·3: Throughput performance measurements in testbed. When
node A0 starts increasing its packet generation rate, the throughput of
nodes A1 and A2 vanishes.
during the first 300 seconds. After 300 seconds, A0 starts transmitting packets at
1 Mb/s. As a result, the throughput of nodes A1 and A2 suddenly vanishes. Once
node A0 resumes transmitting at 400 Kb/s, the throughput of node A1 and node
A2 recovers. This result is similar to the simulation result in Section 3.3.2. This
experimentally proves that the cascading DoS attack can be achieved in practice.
3.3.2 Simulations
In the previous section, we demonstrated the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS
attack on an experimental testbed. This testbed relies on commercial cards that are
black boxes for all purposes. For instance, the driver of the Wi-Fi card and the rate
adaptation algorithm are closed-source. There are also substantial usage restrictions,
such as parameter settings.
In order to gain a better insight into the attack in large-scale networks, we resort
to ns-3 simulations, a state-of-the-art simulator which includes high-fidelity wireless
libraries. We show the occurrence of cascading DoS attacks
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1. In ad hoc networks with fixed bit rate;
2. In ad hoc networks under Minstrel rate adaptation;
3. In infrastructure networks;
4. In ring topology networks;
5. In an indoor scenario;
and the countering of cascading DoS attacks
6. In networks with RTS/CTS enabled.
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(a) As the traffic load
at node A0 increases,
the utilization of remote
nodes (e.g., A20 and A40)
exhibits a phase transi-
tion.
































(b) Utilization of nodes
Ai (i ≥ 1) for differ-
ent traffic loads at node
A0. The utilization con-
verges as i gets large.
When the load at node A0
changes from 0.4 to 0.6,
the sequence of utilization
converge to different lim-
its, illustrating the phase
transition.
Figure 3·4: Occurrence of cascading DoS attacks in ad hoc networks
with fixed bit rate.
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Fixed bit rate
We first describe the occurrence of a cascading DoS attack in an ad hoc network with
fixed bit rate. We consider a linear topology consisting of 41 pairs of nodes (i.e. a
sequence of 41 hidden nodes), as shown in Figure 3·1. Each packet is transmitted
over a single-hop path (similar to Wi-Fi Direct). We fix the bit rate to 1 Mb/s and
the retry limit to R = 7.
We set up a Wi-Fi network using the standard IEEE 802.11 library in ns-3. At
each node Ai, i ≥ 1, the generation rate of UDP packets is λi = 8.125 pkts/s. The
generation rate of UDP packets at node A0, λ0, varies from 1.25 to 61.25 pkts/s.
Packets at each node are generated according to a Poisson process, hence different
nodes start transmitting at different times. The size of each packet is 2000 bytes.
Each node has the same transmission power (40 mW). We set the propagation loss
between node Ai and Bi to 80 dB and the propagation loss between node Ai and Bi+1
to 70 dB. We run each simulation five times for 1,000 seconds, and average out the
results.
The (exogenous) load at each node Ai is denoted ρi = λiT , where T represents
the duration of each packet transmission attempt (0.016 second in our case). The
utilization of a node Ai, denoted ui, is defined as the fraction of time the node is busy
transmitting bits on the channel.
Figure 3·4(a) depicts the utilization u1, u20, and u40 as a function of ρ0, the load at
node A0. The utilization of node A1, u1, increases smoothly until it reaches its upper
limit. However, the utilizations of nodes A20 and A40 remain low until u0 reaches
a certain threshold around ρ0 = 0.5, at which point u20 and u40 suddenly jump to
a high value. This sudden jump corresponds to a phase transition, and the critical
threshold represents the phase transition point.
Figure 3·4(b) illustrates the phase transition in a different way. The figure depicts
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Figure 3·5: Simulation results with Minstrel rate adaptation. When
node A0 generates packets at 5 Mb/s and transmits, the throughput of
nodes A20 and A40 vanishes. The average bit rates of nodes A20 and
A40 also reduce to 1 Mb/s. This result indicates that nodes A20 and
A40 are transmitting packets at the lowest bit rate, however with no
throughput (all their packets collide).
the utilization of each node Ai for i ≥ 1, as i increases. Again, we observe that
different values of ρ0 lead to two completely distinct behaviour for the sequence of
utilizations (ui)
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i=0 (i.e., u40 ' 0.3 when ρ0 = 0.2 and ρ0 = 0.4, while u40 ' 0.75 when
ρ0 = 0.6 and ρ0 = 0.8). Note that the upper limit of the utilization does not reach 1,
due to inter-frame spacing requirements and (random) backoff delays mandated by
IEEE 802.11.
Rate Adaptation
We next consider the same network setting as in the previous section, but this time
we assume that nodes can transmit at different bit rates. We specifically assume that
nodes implement the Minstrel rate adaptation algorithm. In this case, the attack
works by coercing the rate adaptation algorithm to reduce the bit rate to 1 Mb/s
at each node, thus leading to similar results to those shown in Section 3.3.2. In our
simulations, the parameter EWMA of Minstrel is set to 0.25 (Xia et al., ).
We set λ0 = 312.5 pkts/s and λi = 31.25 pkts/s (i ≥ 1) for the packet generation
rates. As shown in Figure 3·5, packet transmissions at node A0 start after t = 100 s.
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During the first 100 seconds, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 remain around
0.5 Mb/s, which implies that all the packets are received. Once node A0 starts
transmitting packets, the throughput of nodes A20 and A40 is brought down to close
to zero. We also observe that the bit rates at node A20 and A40 go down to 1 Mb/s,
due to the repeated packet collisions. Once node A0 stops transmitting at t = 700 s,
nodes A20 and A40 recover.


























(a) When node A0
generates packets at
5 Mb/s and transmits,
the throughput of nodes
A20 and A40 vanishes.
























(b) When node A20
generates packets at
5 Mb/s and transmits,
the throughput of node
A40 vanishes while the
throughput of node A0
does not.
Figure 3·6: Simulation results under AP mode without reassoci-
ation. Nodes Ai are stations and nodes Bi are access points, for
i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }.
























Figure 3·7: Simulation results under AP mode with reassociation.
When node A0 generates packets at 5 Mb/s and transmits, the through-
put of node A20 and A40 significantly decreases.
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Infrastructure networks
We next show that cascading DoS attacks are also feasible in infrastructure networks.
Since the infrastructure mode is more widely used than ad hoc in practice, the feasi-
bility of the cascading DoS attack in infrastructure networks increases its severity and
potential impact. We repeat the simulations of Section 3.3.2 except that we set nodes
Bi as access points, and nodes Ai as stations. The initial beacon starting time at
each AP is a random variable that is uniformly distributed between 0 and 102.4 ms.
We first investigate the cases where stations do not restart association when bea-
cons are missing. Toward this end, we set the number of consecutive beacons that
must be missed before restarting association, i.e. the attribute MaxMissBeacons in
ns-3, to a large value. Otherwise, we use the default settings of ns-3 for the APs and
the stations (ns-3, 2018). Figure 3·6 shows similar results as in Section 3.3.2, namely
when a cascading DoS attack is launched by node A0, as shown in Figure 3·6(a), the
remote nodes A20 and A40 in the sequence exhibit a phase transition. If the attacker
is node A20, the simulation result in Figure 3·6(b) shows that the throughput of node
A40 vanishes but the throughput of node A0 does not. This result shows that an
attack can be launched from any node Ai in the topology and the following nodes in
the sequence (i.e., Ai+1, Ai+2, . . .) will experience congestion.
We next consider the case where stations restart association when beacons are
missing. We set MaxMissBeacons = 10, which is the default value in ns-3 (ns-3, 2018).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 3·7. When Node A0 starts to transmit
packets, we observe a significant throughput degradation at nodes A20 and A40, but
the throughput does not vanish completely. The reason is that if Ai disassociates
from its AP Bi over a certain period then node Ai+1 is not affected by interference
coupling during that period. This result indicates that reassociations help mitigate
cascading DoS attacks, though throughput performance is still significantly impaired.
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Ring topology
We investigate cascading DoS attacks in a ring topology with 41 pairs of nodes, as
shown in Figure 3·8. In our previous results for linear topologies, the effect of an
attack disappears once the attacker reduces its packet generation rate. However, the
effect of an attack in a ring topology can last for a long period of time after the
attack stops. Node Ai (i = 0, 1, . . . ) generate packets at rate 0.5 Mb/s, following a
Poisson process. At time t = 300 s, node A0 increases its packet generation rate to
11 Mb/s and the throughput of all the nodes vanishes. Yet, unlike results in linear
topologies, the throughput of the nodes does not recover after node A0 reduces its
packet generation rate back to 0.5 Mb/s. The cyclic nature of the topology reinforces
the attack even after the trigger stops.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3·9. During the first 100 seconds, all the nodes
Ai (i = 0, 1, . . . ) generate packets at 0.5 Mb/s. At time t = 300 s, node A0 increases
its packet generation rate to 11 Mb/s. As a result, the throughput of all nodes
vanishes. Yet, unlike results in linear topologies, the throughput of the nodes does
not recover after node A0 reduces its packet generation rate back to 0.5 Mb/s. The
cyclic nature of the topology reinforces the attack even after the trigger stops.
Building model
In this section, we use the ns-3 HybridBuildingsPropagationLossModel library (ns-
3, 2018) to demonstrate the feasibility of cascading DoS attacks in an indoor scenario.
Models in this library realistically characterize the propagation loss across different
spectrum bands (i.e., ranging from 200 MHz to 2.6 GHz), different environments (i.e.,
urban, suburban, open areas), and different node positions with respect to buildings
(i.e., indoor, outdoor and hybrid). The building models take into account the pene-
















Figure 3·8: Ring topology under cascading DoS attack. The dash
circle represents the transmission range of the transmitter.


























Figure 3·9: Simulation results under a ring topology. When the packet
generation rate of node A0 increases, the throughput of nodes A20 and
A40 vanishes. This effect continues even when the packet generation
rate of node A0 decreases.
office, and commercial).
In our simulations, we consider a 20-floor office building with six rooms in each
floor, as shown in Figure 3·10. We assume that five pairs of Wi-Fi nodes (Ai, Bi) are
active in the building, where node Ai transmits packets to nodes Bi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4).
The bit rate is set to 1 Mb/s, the retry limit to R = 7, and the frequency to 2.4 GHz.
The generation rate of UDP packets at nodes Ai, i ≥ 1, is λi = 8.125 pkts/s. Packets
are 2000 bytes long.
We turn on and off transmissions at node A0 to observe how it impacts the
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throughput of other nodes. Simulation results are shown in Figure 3·11. When
node A0 does not transmit, the throughput of node A4 is 0.13 Mb/s and it incurs no
packet loss. However, when node A0 starts transmitting, the throughput of node A4
collapses. The throughput of node A4 recovers only after node A0 stops transmitting.











A0, A2, A4 B0, B2, B4
B1, B3 A1, A3
(a) Top view.
























Figure 3·10: Office building model. The building has 20 floors (z-axis)
and 6 rooms in each floor (x and y axes).

























Figure 3·11: Simulation results using ns-3 building model. When
node A0 transmits, the throughput of remote node A4 collapses.
RTS/CTS
We next evaluate the impact of enabling RTS/CTS in the topology under consider-
ation. Specifically, we repeat the simulations of Section 3.3.2, but with RTS/CTS
enabled. Figure 3·12 shows that transmissions by node A0, which start after 100 s,
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Figure 3·12: Simulation results when enable RTS/CTS. The increase
of the packet generation rate of node A0 does not affect the throughput
of nodes A20 and A40.
have no effect on the throughput of remote nodes A20 and A40. This shows that
RTS/CTS is an effective solution against cascading DoS attacks in this scenario.
3.4 Analysis
In this section, we develop a stylized, analytical model that provides qualitative in-
sight into the network behavior observed in the simulations and experiments for the
linear topology. Specifically, our goal is to explain why and under what conditions
the phase transition occurs, and shed light into the roles played by the retry limit R
and the traffic load at the different nodes.
3.4.1 Model
We consider the linear topology shown in Figure 3·1. Packet generations at each node
Ai form a Poisson process with rate λi. The packet size is fixed and the duration of
each packet transmission attempt is T (we assume a fixed bit rate). A transmission
by node Ai+1 is successful only if does not overlap with any transmission by (hidden)
node Ai.
If a packet collides, it is retransmitted until either it is successfully received or the
retry count reaches the limit R. Let 1 ≤ ri ≤ R represent the mean retry count at
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node Ai. Note that the initial packet transmission is included in that count. Then,
the mean service time of a packet at node Ai is riT . To keep the analysis tractable,
timing details of Wi-Fi, such as DIFS, SIFS, and back-off inter-frame spacing are
ignored. Therefore the upper limit of the utilization equals 1 in our analysis.
We denote the utilization of node Ai by 0 ≤ ui ≤ 1, where ui represents the
fraction of time node Ai transmits. If ui = 1, node Ai is congested and transmits
continuously. Otherwise, node Ai is uncongested and transmits packets at rate riλ.
Therefore, the utilization of node Ai for all i ≥ 0 is
ui = min{riλiT, 1}. (3.1)
Note that there is no retransmission at node A0 and r0 = 1.
Our model represents a special case of interacting queues, which are notoriously
difficult to analyze (Rong and Ephremides, 2009). To make the analysis tractable,
we assume that:
1. Packet transmissions and retransmissions at each uncongested node Ai form a
Poisson process with rate riλ.
2. The probability that a packet transmitted by node Ai collides is independent
of previous attempts. This probability is denoted pi.
Though the assumption of Poisson retransmissions is not fully consistent with the
Wi-Fi protocol, it is similar to the “random-look” model used by Kleinrock and Tobagi
in their analysis of (single hop) random access networks (Kleinrock et al., 1975) (see
also (Bertsekas and Gallager, 1992)[Ch. 4]). The simulations do not incorporate the
simplifications used to make the analysis tractable, yet lead to the same effects. We
stress that beside these assumptions, the rest of our analysis is exact.
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3.4.2 Iterative analysis of the utilization
Our goal is to find the utilization at each node i ≥ 0 and in the limit as i → ∞.
We consider the same scenario as in our simulations, whereby node A0 (the attacker)
varies its traffic load
ρ0 , λ0T, (3.2)
while all other nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have the same traffic load
ρ , λiT, (3.3)
where 0 < ρ < 1. We aim to understand if and how changes in the value of ρ0 affect
the utilization of nodes that are located far away as function of the parameters ρ and
R.
First, we get the utilization at node A0:
u0 = min{ρ0, 1}. (3.4)
We next develop an iterative procedure to derive ui+1 from ui. From (3.1) and
(3.3),
ui+1 = min{ri+1ρ, 1}. (3.5)
We first relate ri+1 to pi+1, the probability that a packet transmitted by node
Ai+1 collides. Based on Assumption 2, the probability that a packet is successfully
received after 1 ≤ r ≤ R attempts is (1− pi+1)(pi+1)r−1 while the probability that a
packet fails to be received after R attempts is (pi+1)
R. Hence, the mean retry count
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We next relate pi+1 to ui. First, suppose ui < 1 (i.e., node Ai is uncongested).
Assume that node Ai+1 starts a packet transmission (or retransmission) at some
arbitrary time t = t′. We compute pi+1 by conditioning on whether or not node Ai
is transmitting at time t′. Note that due the Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages
(PASTA) property, the transmission state of node Ai at time t = t
′ is the same as at
any random point of time.
If node Ai transmits at time t
′, which occurs with probability ui, then the packet
transmitted by node Ai+1 collides with probability 1. If node Ai does not transmit
at time t′, which occurs with probability 1 − ui, then a collision occurs only if node
Ai starts a transmission during the interval [t
′, t′ + T ]. Since the packet inter-arrival
time on the channel is exponentially distributed with mean riT , such an event occurs
with probability
(1− e−riλiT ) = (1− e−ui), (3.7)
based on Assumption 1. Therefore, the unconditional probability that a packet trans-
mitted by node Ai+1 collides is
pi+1 = 1 · ui + (1− e−ui) · (1− ui)
= 1− e−ui(1− ui). (3.8)
Next, suppose ui = 1 (i.e., nodeAi is congested). In that case, all the transmissions
by node Ai+1 collide and pi+1 = 1. We note that (3.8) still provides the correct result.
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3.4.3 Limiting behavior of the utilization
We next analyze the limiting behavior of the iteration given by (3.9). The sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 corresponds to a discrete non-linear dynamical system (Lynch, 2004). Such
systems are generally complex as they may converge to a point, to a cycle (i.e., they
exhibit periodic behavior), or not converge at all (i.e., they exhibit chaotic behavior).
The main result of this section is to show that the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 always con-
verges to a point. However, the limit depends on the initial utilization u0.








We then rewrite (3.9) as follows:
ui+1 = min {f(ui), 1} . (3.11)
We say that ω ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed point of (3.11) if
ω = min {f(ω), 1} . (3.12)
Suppose (3.12) has K different fixed points (Theorem 4 in the sequel will show
that K ≥ 1). We denote by Ω the ordered set of all the fixed points of (3.12). That
is,
Ω , {ω1, . . . , ωk, . . . , ωK}, (3.13)
where ω1 < . . . < ωk < . . . < ωK .
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We are next going to show that for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], the limit of the sequence (ui)∞i=0
is one of the elements in Ω. To prove this result, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let u, u′ ∈ (ωk, ωk+1), where k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. If f(u) > u, then
f(u′) > u′. If f(u) < u, then f(u′) < u′.
Proof. The proof goes by contradiction. Let u, u′ ∈ (ωk, ωk+1). Suppose f(u) > u
and f(u′) < u′. Since f is continuous in (ωk, ωk+1), then by the intermediate-value
theorem there exists a point u′′ between u and u′ such that f(u′′) = u′′ . Thus, u′′ is
a fixed point of (3.12). This contradicts the fact that no fixed point exists between
ωk and ωk+1.
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.
1. Let u0 ∈ (ωk, ωk+1), where k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. If f(u0) > u0, the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωk+1. If f(u0) < u0, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωk.
2. If u0 ∈ [0, ω1), the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ω1.
3. If ωK < 1 and u0 ∈ (ωK , 1], the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ωK.
Proof.
1. Let ωk < u0 < ωk+1, where k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}. Since pi ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
the function f is continuous and monotonically increasing, f(ωk) < f(u0) <
f(ωk+1). Hence, according to (3.11) and (3.12), we get
ωk ≤ u1 ≤ ωk+1. (3.14)
Now, suppose u1 = f(u0) > u0. If u1 = ωk+1, then the result is proven. If
u1 < ωk+1, then by Lemma 1 and Equation (3.14), we have u2 = f(u1) > u1.
Applying the same argument inductively, either there exists some value M ≥ 2
such that ui = ωk+1 for all i ≥ M , or the sequence (ui)∞i=0 is monotonically
increasing and upper bounded by ωk+1. According to the monotone convergence
theorem, the sequence converges. Since there is no other fixed point between
u0 and ωk+1 and f is continuous, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 must converge to ωk+1.
The case u1 = f(u0) < u0 is handled similarly.
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2. Similar to Lemma 1, one can show that if there exists u ∈ [0, ω1) such that
f(u) > u, then f(u′) > u′ for all u′ ∈ [0, ω1). Since f(0) = ρ > 0, the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω1.
3. This is handled similarly to case 2.
3.4.4 Phase transition analysis
In the previous section, we showed that the limit of the sequence of node utilizations
(ui)
∞
i=0 must be one of the fixed points in the set Ω. A phase transition represents a sit-
uation where a small change of u0 leads to an abrupt change of the limit. Specifically,
we focus on the case when the limit jumps to 1. Formally:
Definition 1 (Network congestion). A network is said to be congested if (ui)
∞
i=0
converges to 1. Else, the network is said to be uncongested.
Definition 2 (Phase transition). A network experiences a phase transition if there
exists a fixed point ω ∈ Ω, such that if u0 < ω the network is uncongested, and if
u0 > ω the network is congested. We refer to ω as the phase transition point.
We note that a phase transition can possibly occur only if ωK = 1, since otherwise
the network is never congested, irrespective of u0.
A network must fall in one of the following three regimes:
1. The network is uncongested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
2. The network is congested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
3. A phase transition occurs.
Our goal in the following is to determine what regime prevails under different network
parameters.
For this purpose, we investigate the existence and properties of solutions of (3.12).
First, we investigate the case ω = 1.
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Lemma 3. If ρ > 1/R, then
1. ωK = 1.
2. If K = 1, then for all u0 ∈ [0, ωK ] the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ωK.
3. If K ≥ 2, then for all u0 ∈ (ωK−1, ωK ] the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ωK.
Proof.
1. Let ρ ≥ 1/R. We compute the RHS of (3.12) at ω = 1 and obtain min{f(1), 1} =
min{Rρ, 1} = 1, which proves that a fixed point indeed exists at ω = 1.
2. If ρ > 1/R, then f(1) = Rρ > 1. Since f(1) > 1, then for all u0 ∈ (0, ωK) , we
have f(u0) > u0, based on an argument similar to Lemma 1, and the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to 1, following an argument similar to Theorem 2.
3. This is handled similarly to Part 2.
Lemma 3 indicates that the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 can converge to 1 (depending on u0),
if ρ > 1/R. Besides this special case, (3.12) can be rewritten
f(ω) = ω. (3.15)
We look for solutions of (3.15) that belong to the interval [0, 1]. Each such solution
is an element of Ω.
Equation (3.15) is difficult to work with because it contains two unknown variables,






r=1 (1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1
. (3.16)
For each value of ρ, the solutions of (3.15) must satisfy
hR(ω) = ρ. (3.17)
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The following theorem establishes the prevailing network regimes for different
parameters.
Theorem 4.
1. If ρ < 1/R, then the network is uncongested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
2. If hmaxR > 1/R and 1/R < ρ < h
max
R , then a phase transition occurs and the
phase transition point is ωK−1.
3. If ρ > hmaxR , then the network is congested for all u0 ∈ [0, 1].
Proof.
1. If ρ < 1/R, then Rρ < 1 and the utilization of each node is always less than 1.
Hence, for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], the network is always uncongested. Note that since
hR(0) = 0, hR(1) = 1/R, and hR is continuous, (3.17) must have at least one
solution (i.e., at least one fixed point exists).
2. Let ρ ∈ (1/R, hmaxR ). We know that hR(0) = 0 and hR(1) = 1/R. Since the
function hR is continuous, (3.17) must have at least one solution (i.e, at least
one fixed point strictly smaller than 1 exists). Also, because ρ > 1/R, a fixed
point point at ω = 1 exists (i.e., ωK = 1), by Part 1 of Lemma 3. Thus, there
are K ≥ 2 fixed points.
By Part 3 of Lemma 3, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ωK for all u0 ∈
(ωK−1, ωK ]. Moreover, by Theorem 2, the limit of the sequence (ui)∞i=0 is no
larger than ωK−1 for all u0 ≤ ωK−1. Hence, a phase transition exists at ωK−1.
3. If ρ > hmaxR , then (3.15) has no solution. Moreover, since ρ > h
max
R ≥ hR(1) =
1/R, we get ρ > 1/R. By Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 3, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0
converges to 1 for any u0 ∈ [0, 1], and the network is always congested.
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We next illustrate Theorem 4 for different values of R, using Figure 3·13. First,
consider R = 4 as shown in Figure 3·13(a). Since hmaxR = 1/R = 0.25, there exists
no traffic load ρ for which a phase transition exists. Either the network is always
uncongested (for ρ < 1/R), or it is always congested (for ρ > 1/R).
Next, consider R = 7 as shown in Figure 3·13(b). There, hmaxR = 0.166 > 1/R =
0.143. Hence, a phase transition occurs if ρ ∈ (0.143, 0.166). For instance, consider
the case ρ = 0.15. Then, the equation hR(ω) = ρ has two solutions. Including
the fixed point ω = 1 (since ρ > 1/R), the set Ω has K = 3 fixed points: {ω1 =
0.265, ω2 = 0.777, ω3 = 1}. Hence, by Theorem 4, the network is uncongested if
u0 < 0.777, and congested if u0 > 0.777.
The case R = 10 also has a phase transition region, as shown in Figure 3·13(c).


























































(c) R = 10
Figure 3·13: Illustration of the different network regimes for different
values of R. For each value of ρ, the fixed points are the solutions
of hR(ω) = ρ. In addition, the fixed point ω = 1 always exists when
ρ > 1/R. A phase transition region exists if the maximum of hR(ω),
hmaxR , is strictly greater than hR(1) = 1/R.
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3.4.5 Sufficient condition for phase transition
In the previous section, we showed that a phase transition exists in the region 1/R <
ρ < hmaxR , if h
max
R > 1/R. In this section, we derive an explicit lower bound on h
max
R ,
which provides a simple condition for the existence of a phase transition. First, we
establish a relationship between the derivatives of hR(ω) for different values of R, but
a given value of ω.
Lemma 5. For ω ∈ [0, 1], if there exists R∗ ≥ 1 such that h′R∗(ω) ≤ 0, then h′R(ω) ≤ 0
for all R > R∗.






































For r ≥ 2, we have
Ψ′r(ω) = −




Φr(ω) , −1 + eω + (3− 2r)ω + (r − 1)ω2.
Clearly, the terms e−ω, (1− e−ω(1− ω))r−2 and ω2 in (3.21) are all positive. Thus,




We next investigate the signs of the first and second derivatives of the function
Φ(ω). We have
Φ′r(ω) = e
ω + 3− 2r + 2(r − 1)ω, (3.22)
Φ′′r(ω) = e
ω + 2(r − 1) > 0, (3.23)
for all ω ∈ [0, 1] and r ≥ 2. From (3.23), we find that Φ′r(ω) is monotonically
increasing with ω.
For any r ≥ 2, we obtain from (3.22) that
Φ′r(0) = 4− 2r, (3.24)
Φ′r(1) = e+ 1. (3.25)
We distinguish between three possible cases regarding the sign of Φr(ω):
1. For r = 2, Φ′2(0) = 0. Hence, Φ
′
2(ω) > 0. The function Φ2(ω) is monotonically
increasing with ω. Since Φ2(0) = e− 1 > 0, Φ2(ω) is always positive.
2. For r = 3, Φ′3(0) < 0. The function Φ3(ω) first decreases then increases as ω
increases from 0 to 1. Since Φ3(0) = 0 and Φ3(1) > 0, the sign of the function
Φ3(ω) turns from negative to positive as ω increases from 0 to 1.
3. For r > 3, Φ′r(0) < 0. The function Φr(ω) first decreases then increases as ω
increases from 0 to 1. Since Φr(0) = 0 and Φr(1) < 0, the sign of the function
Φr(ω) is always negative.
Therefore, by (3.19), for any given ω ∈ [0, 1], the sign of the function Φr(ω) turns
from being positive to being negative as r increases. Equivalently, the sign of the
function Ψ′r(ω) turns from being negative to being positive as r increases.




is nonnegative for R = R∗, then it is also nonnegative
for all R ≥ R∗. Equivalently, by (3.18), if (h−1R (ω))′ is nonpositive for R = R∗, then
it is also nonpositive for all R ≥ R∗, which completes the proof.








−ω(1− 3ω + ω2). (3.27)
The next corollary is the logical transposition of Lemma 5.
Corollary 1. If h′∞(ω) ≥ 0, then h′R(ω) ≥ 0 for all R ≥ 1.
The following lemma establishes that the function hR(ω) is always strictly increas-






Lemma 6. Let 0 ≤ ω < α. Then, h′R(ω) > 0, for all R ≥ 1.
Proof. Let the function h∞(ω) and its derivative h′∞(ω) be defined as in (3.26) and
(3.27), respectively. Since e−ω is always positive, h′∞(ω) has the same sign as (1 −
3ω+ω2). The unique root of (1−3ω+ω2) = 0 for ω ∈ [0, 1] is w¯ as defined in (3.28).
Thus, (1 − 3ω + ω2) is positive when 0 ≤ ω < α, and so is h′∞(ω). By Corollary
1, h′R(ω) > 0 for 0 ≤ ω < α and for all R ≥ 1.
The consequence of Lemma 6 is that for all R ≥ 1,
hmaxR ≥ hR(α). (3.29)
This equation provide a lower bound on hmaxR that can easily be computed. We then
obtain the following sufficient condition for the existence of phase transition.
Theorem 7. Let α be defined as in (3.28) and suppose hR(α) > 1/R. Then, a phase
transition is guaranteed to exist for any ρ ∈ (1/R, hR(α)).
Proof. From Theorem 4, we know that a phase transition exists if 1/R < ρ < hmaxR .
By (3.29) and the assumption that hR(α) > 1/R, the proof follows.
The next theorem establishes an even more explicit lower bound on hmaxR .
Theorem 8. Let h∞(ω) and α be defined as in (3.26) and (3.28), respectively. Then,










Thus, by (3.29) and (3.30), hmaxR > h∞(α) ' 0.161. Note that this bound is asymp-
totically tight as R→∞ since hmax∞ = h∞(α).
From Theorems 4 and 8, it follows that a phase transition exists if 1/R < 0.161.
Hence:
Corollary 2. A phase transition is guaranteed to exist for R ≥ 7 and ρ ∈ [1/R, 0.161].
We note that the lower bound on hmaxR is quite tight. For instance, h
max
7 = 0.166.
Moreover, hmaxR decreases with R (this follows from (3.16), since for any ω ∈ [0, 1] the
denominator increases as R gets larger).
3.4.6 Stability of fixed points
In this subsection, we use stability theory to shed further light into the limiting
behaviour of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0. Specifically, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to
stable fixed points of Ω and diverges from unstable fixed points of Ω. We will show
that the stability of the fixed points of (3.15) are determined by the sign of h′R(ω) at
those points.
Informally, a fixed point ω is stable (or an attractor), if there exists a domain
containing ω, such that if u0 belongs to that domain, then (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω.
Definition 3 (Stability of a fixed point). Let u0 ∈ [0, 1]. A fixed point ω ∈ Ω is stable
if there exists  > 0 such that if |u0 − ω| < , the sequence (ui)∞i=0 converges to ω. It
is unstable if for all u0 6= ω the sequence (ui)∞i=0 does not converge to ω.
Recall that according to Lemma 3, a special fixed point of (3.12) exists at ω = 1,
if ρ > 1/R. According to Definition 3, this fixed point is stable. Besides this special
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case, the rest of the fixed points satisfy Equation (3.15). To establish the stability of
those fixed points, we will employ the following proposition.
Proposition 1 ((Lynch, 2004)). Suppose that a continuously differentiable function
f has a fixed point ω. Then, ω is stable if |f ′(ω)| < 1 and unstable if |f ′(ω)| > 1.
The next theorem provides a criterion to establish the stability of a fixed point
ω ∈ Ω with respect to the function hR(ω).
Theorem 9. Consider a fixed point ω ∈ Ω, where ω < 1. Then ω is stable if
h′R(ω) > 0 and unstable if h
′
R(ω) < 0.












1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1 = f(ω)
ρ
. (3.32)
If one can show that (3.31) implies |f ′(ω)| < 1, then according to Proposition 1, the
fixed point ω is stable. We multiply both sides of (3.31) by (Γ(ω))2 and obtain
Γ(ω)− ωΓ′(ω) > 0. (3.33)











From (3.32) and (3.34), we get
f ′(ω) = ρΓ′(ω) < 1.
Since f(ω) is monotonically increasing with ω, for ω ∈ [0, 1], we conclude
0 < f ′(ω) < 1.






















Figure 3·14: Stability of fixed points with R = 10. Given a load
ρ = 0.13 (dash line), Ω contains three fixed points: ω1 = 0.2, ω2 = 0.7
and ω3 = 1. The fixed point ω1 is stable because h
′
R(ω1) > 0 and ω2
is unstable because h′R(ω2) < 0. The fixed point ω3 = 1 exists and is
stable because ρ > 1/R. Therefore, the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0 converges to
ω1 if u0 < ω2, and to ω3 if u0 > ω2.
Similarly, h′R(ω) < 0 implies f
′(ω) > 1, which means that ω is unstable.
We next show how the stability analysis of the fixed points helps to determine the
limit of the sequence (ui)
∞
i=0. Consider, for instance, the example shown in Figure 3·14
with parameters R = 10 and ρ = 0.13. Under these parameters, Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} =
{0.2, 0.7, 1}.
The fixed points ω1 and ω2 are the solutions of hR(ω) = ρ. According to Theorem
9, ω1 is stable and ω2 is unstable. The fixed point ω3 = 1 exists and is stable, since
ρ > 1/R.
According to Theorem 4, ω2 is a phase transition point. Hence, the sequence
(ui)
∞
i=0 converges to ω1 if u0 < ω2 and the network is uncongested. If u0 > ω2, the
sequence converges to ω3 and the network is congested.
3.4.7 Heterogeneous traffic load
In previous subsections, we assumed that node A0 varies its traffic load ρ0, but all
other nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have the same traffic load ρ. We now relax this assumption
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and assume that nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) have different traffic loads ρi = λiT . We next
prove that a phase transition still occurs, as long as all the traffic loads fall in the
appropriate range.
Theorem 10. Suppose hmaxR > 1/R. If ρi ∈ (1/R, hmaxR ) for all i ≥ 1, then a phase
transition occurs.
Proof. Let ρmax = maxi≥1 ρi and ρmin = mini≥1 ρi. According to Theorem 4, the
network is uncongested when ρ0 = 0 and the load at each node Ai is ρmax < h
max
R .
Hence, the network must remain uncongested when the load at each node Ai is smaller
than ρmax.
Similarly, the network is congested when ρ0 = 1 and the load at each node Ai is
ρmin > 1/R. Hence, it must remain congested when the load at each node Ai is larger
than ρmin. Thus, a phase transition occurs when 1/R < ρi < h
max
R for all i ≥ 1.
3.4.8 Comparison with simulation results
We compare the results of our analysis with ns-3 simulations, for different settings
of the retry limit R and load ρ. For the simulations, we consider an ad hoc network
composed of 41 pairs of nodes, as described in Section 3.3.2.
Region of phase transition
To check whether a phase transition exists for a given R, we run simulations both
for ρ0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1. If the node utilizations in the limit (i.e., for node A40) is the
same in both cases, then we assume that there is no phase transition. If the limits
are different, then a phase transition exists.
Figure 3·15 indicates that the existence of a phase transition is related to the retry
limit, as predicted by our analysis. For the case R = 4, there is no phase transition,
while a phase transition occurs in the cases R = 7 and R = 10. in our simulations
for any R ≤ 6.
The analysis also reasonably approximates the phase transition region. For R = 7,
the simulations show that a phase transition exists if ρ ∈ (0.12, 0.16), while the anal-
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Load ρ at node A i (i ≥ 1)





























Figure 3·15: Simulation of the limiting behaviour of the node uti-
lization in a network of 41 pairs of nodes. For R = 4, the limit is the
same when ρ0 = 0 and ρ0 = 1, hence no phase transition is observed.
However, for R = 7 and R = 10, the limits are different, hence showing
the existence of a region of load ρ in which a phase transition occurs.
ysis predicts ρ ∈ (0.14, 0.17). For R = 10, the simulation results are ρ ∈ (0.08, 0.14)
while the analysis predicts ρ ∈ (0.10, 0.16). We note that the size of the phase tran-
sition region increases with R, as predicted by the analysis.
Heterogeneous traffic load
We next show the feasibility of a cascading DoS attack in a network where the traffic
load at different node is heterogeneous, in line with the analysis of Section 3.4.7.
Specifically, the traffic load ρi at each node Ai (i ≥ 1) is a continuous random variable
that is uniformly distributed between 0.11 and 0.15.
Figure 3·16 shows the simulation results for retry limit R = 7. When ρ0, the load
of node A0, is below 0.5, the network is uncongested and the utilizations of nodes Ai
oscillate around 0.35 as i gets large. Note that the sequence does not converge to a
fixed value due to the different traffic loads at the different nodes. However, when ρ0
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Figure 3·16: Simulation with heterogeneous traffic load in a network
with 41 pairs of nodes. The traffic load of nodes Ai (i ≥ 1) are uniformly
distributed between 0.11 and 0.15. For R = 7, when the load ρ0 changes
from 0.5 to 0.6, the limiting behavior of the sequence of node utilizations
differs, thus indicating the occurrence of phase transition.
exceeds 0.6, the sequence of node utilizations converges to its upper limit, implying
that the network is congested.
3.5 Summary
We describe a new type of DoS attacks against Wi-Fi networks, called cascading DoS
attacks. The attack exploits a coupling vulnerability due to hidden nodes. The attack
propagates beyond the starting location, lasts for long periods of time, and forces the
network to operate at its lowest bit rate. The attack can be started remotely and
without violating the IEEE 802.11 standard, making it difficult to trace back.
We demonstrate the feasibility of such attacks, both through experiments on a
testbed and extensive ns-3 simulations. The simulations show that the attack is
effective in networks operating under fixed and varying bit rates, as well as ad hoc
and infrastructure modes. We show that a small change in the traffic load of the
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attacker can lead to a phase transition of the entire network, from uncongested state
to congested state.
We develop an iterative analysis to characterize the sequence of node utilizations,
and study its limiting behaviour. We show that the sequence always converges to
stable fixed points while an unstable fixed point represents a phase transition point.
Based on the system parameters, we identify when the system remains always un-
congested, congested, or experiences a phase transition caused by a DoS cascading
attack.
The analysis predicts that a phase transition occurs for R ≥ 7 and provides a
simple and explicit estimate of traffic load at each node under which a phase transition
occurs (i.e., ρi ∈ (1/R, 0.161) for all i ≥ 1). The network is always congested when
the traffic load is above the phase transition regime and always uncongested when
the traffic load is below the phase transition regime. Although the analysis is based




Cascading Attacks with Weak Interferers
4.1 Motivation
In Chapter 3, we investigated cascading DoS attacks with strong hidden nodes. How-
ever, since the effect of the attack propagates through a chain of nodes in the network,
we cannot control the strength of the interference except for the first node (i.e., the
attacker). In a more general scenario, interference coupling between two neighboring
networks can be weak, i.e., the interference caused by hidden node does not always
disrupt an ongoing transmissions. Is the cascading DoS attack still feasible in such a
scenario?
In this chapter, we investigate cases where interference caused by hidden nodes is
on the same order or weaker than the signals of sending stations. Our main objective
is to find out whether cascading attacks are still feasible in those situations. Through
extensive ns-3 simulations and mathematical analysis, we provide a positive answer
to this question. The attack leverages two phenomena (Xin and Starobinski, 2018),
which we describe in detail in the chapter.
The first phenomenon is a PHY-layer effect known as receiver capture (Jiang and
Liew, 2007). Accordingly, if the PHY header of the packet transmitted by the hidden
node is decoded first, the packet sent by the station is lost (assuming the two packet
transmissions overlap). Thus, even though not all packets transmitted by the station
are lost, a large fraction still is.
The second phenomenon relates to bit rate adaptation. Specifically, rate adapta-
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tion algorithms vary the bit rate used for packet transmissions based on the observed
quality of the channel. While different algorithms have been proposed in the lit-
erature (Biaz and Wu, 2008), most gradually lower the bit rate upon experiencing
packet losses. Since packet losses are still possible due to the receiver capture effect,
rate adaption algorithms may end up with significantly lowering the bit rate of Wi-Fi
stations, sometimes down to the base rate of 1 Mb/s. As a result, the capacity of the
shared channel is drastically reduced (since each packet transmission uses the shared
channel for a longer amount of time) while leading to a traffic congestion.
The main contributions of this chapter can thus be summarized as follows. We
first identify and document a coupling effect between neighboring cells, due to hidden
nodes and receiver capture. We then analyze and provide simulations of the packet
loss probability with and without receiver capture. We show that with receiver cap-
ture, a packet sent by a station is lost irrespective of the signal-to-interference ratio
(SIR) and the bit rate. Leveraging the above coupling effect, we demonstrate the fea-
sibility of launching cascading attacks on Wi-Fi networks using weak hidden nodes
(i.e., hidden nodes producing weak interference). Through extensive ns-3 simulations,
including for an indoor building model, we show that the coupling effect may propa-
gate, thus reducing the channel capacity across an entire chain of Wi-Fi cells. These
results apply to several rate adaptation algorithms. We next provide an analysis of the
limiting behavior of the channel utilization in a chain of Wi-Fi cells, assuming nodes
implement the Auto Rate Fallback (ARF) rate adaptation algorithm (Kamerman and
Monteban, 1997). In particular, we show how the average bit rate experiences a sharp
drop as the channel utilization gets higher, which provides insight into how the attack
is able to propagate throughout the network.
The rest of the this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce
the network model used for studying cascading attacks. In Section 4.3, we present
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numerical simulations illustrating receiver capture and cascading attacks in various
scenarios. In Section 4.4, we propose analytical models to shed light on and provide
further validation of the results observed in the simulations. We conclude the chapter
in Section 4.5.
4.2 Attack Scenario
We now describe the attack scenario studied in this chapter. Our goal is to assess
the feasibility of a chain reaction. Hence, we consider the network topology shown in
Figure 4·1 which is the same as in Section 3.2. This topology consists of M single-hop
pairs of Wi-Fi nodes. Each pair belongs to a different cell i ∈ (1, 2, 3, . . . ,M). In each
cell i, node Ai transmits packets to node Bi. The dash circle around each node Ai
represents its communication range. We assume that node Bi can sense transmissions
from both nodes Ai and Ai−1, but node Ai and node Ai−1 cannot sense each other
(in Section 4.3.2, we present a realistic network configuration where such a scenario
can occur). Thus, node Ai−1 is a hidden node with respect to node Ai.
In this chapter, we consider the practical scenario where at node Bi the signal
received from the transmitter Ai is stronger than that received from the hidden node
Ai−1. This situation occurs, for instance, when the transmission powers of nodes Ai
and Ai−1 are the same, but the path loss between Ai and Bi is lower than between
Ai−1 and Bi (Giustiniano et al., 2007). This scenario is likely when nodes belonging
to the same cell are located closer than nodes belonging to different cells. In this
scenario, the hidden node causes weak interference, but a packet loss is still possible
due to the receiver capture effect.
If a packet loss occurs at node Bi, node Ai keeps retransmitting that packet as
long as the number of retransmissions (i.e, the retry count) does not exceed a certain







cell 1 cell 2 cell i cell i+1
Figure 4·1: Attack scenario. Each node Ai transmits packets to node
Bi. Node Ai−1 is a hidden node with respect to Ai. Node A1 is the
attacker (first hidden node in the chain).
runs a rate adaptation algorithm, such as ARF, Onoe or AMRR.
The attack proceeds as follows. An adversary that controls node A1 increases its
packet generation rate. Though the interference generated by node A1 is weak, it
stills leads to packet losses on the link between A2 and B2 due to receiver capture.
Hence, node A2 retransmits packets and gradually lowers its bit rate. The lower bit
rate prolongs the duration of packet transmissions. Hence, transmissions by node A2
add interference on the link between A3 and B3 which increases the rate of packet
losses between A3 and B3 and reduces the bit rate of node A3, and so on. In the
next section, we investigate the feasibility and impact of this attack under different
network settings.
4.3 Simulations
In this section, we run ns-3 simulations of IEEE 802.11g/n networks for the scenario
depicted in Figure 4·1. We define the utilization of node Ai as the average fraction of
time during which node Ai transmits. In addition, we denote by SIR the ratio of the
signal strength of node Ai (signal) to the signal strength of node Ai−1 (interference)
observed at node Bi.
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4.3.1 Hidden node
Our first simulation evaluates the impact of a hidden node on the packet loss proba-
bility for different SIR and bit rates. We consider a network comprising M = 2 cells.
In each cell i ∈ {1, 2}, node Ai sends 1500-byte UDP packets to node Bi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Thus, node A1 is a hidden node with respect to node A2. We repeat each simulation
10 times and average the results (we also compute 95% confidential intervals, but
since they are very narrow, they cannot be seen on the graphs).
We consider two cases:
1. Node A1 starts transmitting a packet right after node A2 finishes transmitting
the PLCP preamble and header of a packet.
2. Node A2 starts transmitting a packet right after node A1 finishes transmitting
the PLCP preamble and header of a packet.
Figure 4·2 shows the results for different SIR and bit rates. Case (1) (the curve
in blue) corresponds to the classical capture effect. If the SIR is above a certain
threshold, the packet transmitted by node A2 is received with high probability by
node B2, otherwise it is lost. We note that the threshold is pretty sharp and depends
on the bit rate. The higher the bit rate, the higher the SIR needed to successfully
receive a packet. For instance, Figure 4·2 (a) shows that the threshold for a successful
reception by B2 at 1 Mb/s is about 0 dB. Figures 4·2(b), (c), and (d) show that for bit
rates of 12 Mb/s, 24 Mb/s, and 54 Mb/s, the SIR threshold for successful reception
is about 10 dB, 15 dB, and 25 dB, respectively.
On the other hand, case (2) (the curve in red) corresponds to the receiver capture
effect. We observe that no matter how high the SIR is, a packet transmitted by
node A2 is always lost. We conclude that the order of packet arrivals plays a critical
role and that a weak hidden node can still induce significant packet losses, even at
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Node A1 transmits first
Node A2 transmits first
(a) 1 Mb/s bit rate















Node A1 transmits first
Node A2 transmits first
(b) 12 Mb/s bit rate















Node A1 transmits first
Node A2 transmits first
(c) 24 Mb/s bit rate















Node A1 transmits first
Node A2 transmits first
(d) 54 Mb/s bit rate
Figure 4·2: Packet loss probability due to a hidden node in a two-cell
network. The performance depends on the order of packet arrivals at
the receiver.
high SIR. In Section 4.4.1, we provide further theoretical explanations of the results
depicted in Fig. 4·2.
4.3.2 Cascading attack in an office building
We next demonstrate the impact of a cascading attack in an IEEE 802.11g/n network
comprising M = 3 transmission pairs. The network is deployed in an office floor of a
building containing 11 rooms, as shown in Figure 4·3. The physical parameters of the
wireless channel are based on the building model (ns-3, 2018) of ns-3. The propagation
losses between nodes are estimated according to the hybrid buildings propagation loss
model (ns-3, 2018) of ns-3. The parameter settings of these two models are listed in
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Table 4.1.
Each node Ai transmits 1500 byte UDP packets to nodes Bi, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The retry limit is set to 7. Nodes A2 and A3 generate packets according to Poisson
processes with mean rate 0.7 Mb/s. Simulations are run for 600 seconds. Node A1
(the attacker) starts its transmissions after 200 seconds and ends after 400 seconds.
When node A1 is active, it generates packets at rate 54 Mb/s, which implies that its
transmission queue is never empty.
Figure 4·4(a) depicts the average bit rate at node A3 for different rate adaptation
algorithms, namely ARF, Onoe, and AMRR. In all cases, during the first 200 seconds,
node A1 does not transmit. Hence, the bit rate at nodes A3 climbs from its initial value
of 1 Mb/s to 54 Mb/s. We note that the bit rate under ARF and Onoe converges faster
to 54 Mb/s than under the more conservative AMRR algorithm. Once node A1 starts
transmitting, though, the bit rate of A3 drops quickly to low values between 1 and 2
Mb/s for all three algorithms. The reason for the drop are packet retransmissions by
node A2 which cause packet loss at node B3 due to the receiver capture effect. These
packet losses induce the rate adaptation algorithm at node A3 to lower the bit rate.
We stress here that node B3 is outside the interference range of node A1. Hence, this
result demonstrates the cascading nature of the attack launched by node A1.
The change of the bit rate at node A3 impact its utilization. Figure 4·4(b) illus-
trates this fact. During the first 200 seconds, node A1 does not transmit. We observe
that the utilization of node A3 decreases as its bit rate increases. This is because
the high bit rate shortens the duration of packet transmissions, which in effect means
that the channel capacity is higher from the perspective of node A3. Similarly, when
node A1 is transmitting, the utilization of node A3 increases reaching values at or
above 0.8. This implies that the channel gets congested.









Figure 4·3: Cascading attack in an office building, with three trans-
mission pairs (Ai, Bi), where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Note that node B3 is outside
the interference range of node A1 and therefore packet losses at node
B3 are caused by transmissions of node A2.
Table 4.1: Parameter settings of ns-3 simulation in office building
scenario
Building model
Parameter Values Parameter Values
Building type Office External Wall type Concretewith windows
# of floors 1 Height of floor 3 m
# of rooms 11 Size of each room 6× 4× 3 mat each floor
Hybrid buildings propagation loss model
Frequency 2.4 GHz Shadow sigma indoor 8
Internal wall loss 12 dB Shadow sigma 5external walls
transmitted by node A3, as shown in Table 4.2. Specifically, when node A1 transmit,
B3 misses about 3% of the UDP packets for Onoe and AMRR, and about 8% of
the packets for ARF. Yet, when node A1 is not transmitting, all the UDP packets
transmitted by node A3 are received by node B3. We note that the loss of a UDP
packet implies that all transmissions of that packet at the MAC layer fail (i.e., 7
consecutive packet losses when the retry limit is set to 7).
Table 4.2: Fraction of UDP packets not received in the office building
scenario
UDP packets not received by node B3





































































Figure 4·4: Cascading attack in an office building scenario. Node A1
(attacker) transmits between 200 seconds and 400 seconds. The bit
rate of node A3 drops and its utilization increases significantly during
the attack.
4.3.3 Cascading attack in a large network
We now consider a large Wi-Fi network consisting of M = 20 cells. Again, we assume
each node Ai transmits 1500 byte UDP packets to node Bi, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20}.
Each node uses the ARF rate adaptation algorithm. The retry limit is set 7. To ensure
that the packet loss is only due to the receiver capture effect, we set SIR = 30 dB
(i.e., the interference caused by each hidden node is very weak). The running time of
each simulation is 500 seconds. The packet generation rate of node A1 (the attacker)
varies from 1.08 to 10.8 Mb/s. The packet generation rates of the other nodes range
from 0.054 to 2.16 Mb/s. At each node, the UDP packet generation follows a Poisson
process.
Figure 4·5(a) depicts the utilization of node A20 versus the utilization of node A19,
obtained for different packet generation rates of node A1. The results indicate that
the utilizations of node A19 and A20 are essentially identical, which indicates that the
utilization in a large network converges to a limit.
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Figure 4·5: Utilization and bit rate in a large network. (a) The
utilization of nodes A19 and A20 is about the same, which implies the
existence of a limit. (b) Relationship between bit rate and utilization at
the limit. As the utilization of the attacker A1 increases, the utilization
limit jumps and the bit rate limit drops.
Figure 4·5(b) depicts the average bit rate of node A20 with respect to the utilization
of node A19. When the utilization of node A19 is low (say below 0.05), the bit rate
of node A20 can be as high as 48 Mb/s. Yet, when the utilization of node A19 is
high (say above 0.4), the bit rate of node A20 drops to the base rate of 1 Mb/s. This
trend matches the behavior predicted by the analysis, which we discuss in detail in
Section 4.4.2.
Figure 4·5(b) also shows the impact of node A1 on the other nodes. When the
utilization of node A1 is below 0.1 (blue and green dots), the average bit rate of
node A20 is near 48 Mb/s. However, when the utilization of node A1 exceeds 0.15
(orange and yellow dots), the average bit rate of node A20 drops sharply. This results
implies that node A1 can launch a cascading attack by increasing the rate of packet
transmissions over its channel.
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4.4 Analysis
In this section, we propose analytical models to shed light into the simulation results
shown in Section 4.3. We first analyze the packet loss probability for the two cases
of Section 4.3.1. Next we consider cascading attacks in a large network, based on
the model of Section 4.3.3. We first estimate the limit of the packet loss due to the
receiver capture effect as the number of cells M → ∞. We then model the limiting
behavior of the ARF rate adaptation algorithm.
4.4.1 Hidden node
We analyze the packet loss probability in the two cases presented in Section 4.3.1.
We show that a packet loss in the first case is caused by a CRC error, which depends
on the SIR and the bit rate. On the hand, the packet loss in the second case is caused
by the receiver capture effect, which does not depend on the SIR and the bit rate.
Case (1): A2 transmits before A1
When A2 transmits before A1, packet loss at B2 is due to a CRC error. Specifically,
a CRC error occurs if one or more bits of the received packet are wrong.
The probability of a CRC error can be estimated as follows. Suppose a packet has
n bits. Denote by βj the error rate (probability) of bit j in the packet and assume
that it only depends on the signal to interference ratio during the transmission of






In IEEE 802.11, each bit rate has different resilience to the interference due to
the adoption of different signal modulations and coding schemes. Thus, the bit error
model at each bit rate is different. Generally, a lower bit rate has better resilience
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to interference. For example, as shown in Figure 4·2, a bit rate of 1 Mb/s requires a
SIR of 0 dB or higher to ensure successful reception (capture) of a packet with high
probability. At a bit rate of 54 Mb/s, on the other hand, a packet is successfully
received if the SIR is above 25 dB.
Bit errors models for different modulation and coding schemes in Wi-Fi can be
found in (Pei and Henderson, 2009; Pei and Henderson, 2010). We illustrate here the
computation for the 1 Mb/s bit rate. Denote the channel bandwidth by B and the






We now explain the result for the packet loss probability at 1 Mb/s associated,
shown in Figure 4·2(a). At 1 Mb/s bit rate, B = 22 MHz, and fb = 1 Mb/s.
According to (4.1) and (4.2), when SIRj = 0 dB for all the bits in a packet, the loss
probability of a 1500-byte packet is 1.67×10−6. That is, the transmission is virtually
always successful when the power of interference is equal to the power of the signal.
However, when SIRj = −5 dB, the packet loss probability of a 1500-byte packet is
close to 1. In summary, for case (1), a packet sent by node A2 can be captured if the
SIR is high enough. The SIR thresholds for a successful packet capture depends on
the bit rate.
Case (2): A1 transmits before A2
We next explain why in the second case considered in Section 4.3.1, packet losses
always occur irrespectively of the SIR or bit rate. Since node A1 transmits a packet
before node A2, node B2 detects the PLCP preamble and header of the packet sent
by node A1 and transits into the Rx state. Therefore, it cannot detect the PLCP
preamble and header of the packet sent by node A2. Therefore, a packet loss occurs
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regardless of the SIR. Moreover, in the IEEE 802.11 protocol, the PLCP preamble
and header are always transmitted at the lowest supported rate of the band (e.g., 1
Mb/s for 2.4 GHz). Hence, the packet loss caused by the receiver capture effect does
not relate to the bit rates of the packets sent by nodes A1 and A2.
4.4.2 Asymptotic analysis of cascading attacks for large Wi-Fi networks
In this section, we conduct an asymptotic analysis for a large Wi-Fi network model
similar to that introduced in Section 4.3.3, where each node implements the ARF
algorithm. This analysis sheds light into the relationships between the limits of the
packet loss probability, utilization, and average bit rate for each transmission pair
Ai −Bi, when i is very large.
Our analysis is based on a number of simplifying assumptions required to keep
the analysis tractable. These assumptions are:
• The limit of the utilization (or shortly, the utilization limit) exists and is unique
(this fact was empirically verified with Fig. 4·5(a)). We denote the utilization
limit by ω.
• MAC layer packet transmissions and retransmissions at each node are indepen-
dent and form a Poisson process.
• If a hidden node transmits first, the receiver can always decode the PLCP
preamble and header of the packet sent by that node.
• Packet loss is only due to the receiver capture effect (i.e., the SIR is above
25 dB).
• MAC overhead timing parameters (such as SIFS, DIFS, etc.) are ignored.
Beside these assumptions, the rest of the analysis presented in this section is exact.
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In particular, it captures peculiarities of the ARF protocol and interactions between
neighboring Wi-Fi cells.
Estimation of the limit of the packet loss probability
We first estimate the limit of the packet loss caused by receiver capture in a large
network. We denote this limit L(ω).
Proposition 2. Let the utilization limit be ω. Then, the limit of the packet loss
probability is
L(ω) = ω(1− ω
2
). (4.3)
Proof. Assume i is very large, such that the utilization of Ai and Ai+1 is ω. Remember
that Ai is a hidden node with respect to Ai+1. We define three states of the channel
which are idle, captured by node Ai, and captured by node Ai+1. The packet loss
occurs if node Ai+1 starts to transmit when the channel is captured by node Ai. When
there is no packet transmissions, the channel is idle with probability (1− ω)2. From
our assumption, the PLCP preambles and headers of node Ai can always be decoded
if the channel is not captured first by node Ai+1. Hence, by symmetry, nodes Ai
and Ai+1 have the same probability to capture the channel. The probability that the
channel is captured by node Ai (or node Ai+1) is (1− (1− ω)2)/2 = ω − ω2/2. Due
to the Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages (PASTA) property, the probability that a
node transmits at any random point of time is the same. Without loss of generality,
assume node Ai+1 starts transmitting a packet at time t
′. The probability that the
channel is captured by node Ai at time t
′ is ω − ω2/2.
We note that when the channel is fully utilized (i.e., ω = 1), the probability of a
packet loss due to receiver capture is 1/2. Figure 4·6 depicts the packet loss probability
at different utilizations using our analysis and simulations. The simulation results
match the analysis results well until the node utilization reaches its upper limit. Due
to MAC overhead (which we ignore in the analysis), at a bit rate of 1 Mb/s, the
upper limit of the node utilization is about 0.9. This value is much smaller when
nodes communicate at 54 Mb/s bit rate. Nevertheless, even though it is based on a
number of simplifications, our analysis captures the correct trend.
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Simulation: 1Mbps bit rate
Simulation: 54Mbps bit rate
Analysis
Figure 4·6: Packet loss probability vs. utilization under receiver cap-
ture: asymptotic analysis (Proposition 1) versus simulations.
Limiting behavior of ARF
We next investigate the limiting behavior of ARF under a cascading attack. Given
the utilization limit ω and the limit of the packet loss probability L(ω), our goal is
to characterize the limit of the average bit rate b(ω). In the sequel, we derive the
proportion of packets transmitted at each bit rate bj of ARF, which we denote by
αj(ω). Given αj(ω), we can readily compute b(ω):







Proof. Suppose that a node has large amount of bits X to transmit. The amount of
data that is transmitted at bit rate bj is Xαj(ω). Therefore, the average time spent












Figure 4·5(b), introduced earlier, compares the theoretical result of Theorem 11
and simulations. As one can see from the figure, the theorem captures well the
relationship between the bit rate versus the utilization, and in particular the sharp
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drop of the bit rate of a transmission pair as the channel utilization of its neighboring
pair increases. This phenomenon is a consequence of the receiver capture effect.
We next provide details on how to obtain an analytical expression for αj. We
analyze the behavior of ARF using the theory of semi-Markov processes (Medhi,
2012). The analytical model is based on the work in (Singh and Starobinski, 2007).
However, (Singh and Starobinski, 2007) only considers the case when each node always
has packets available to transmit, i.e., each node is congested. Unlike the analysis
in (Singh and Starobinski, 2007), our analysis also covers the case when nodes are
uncongested. We calculate the fraction of packets that are transmitted at each bit
rate.
Let denote by j the state during which ARF operates at bit rate bj, that is, when
entering state j ARF transmits at bit rate bj until it exits that state. The number of
packets transmitted in that state and the transition probability to the next possible
states (i.e., j−1 or j+1) only depend on the current state j (i.e., these quantities are
independent of the previous states). Thus, the behavior of ARF rate can be modeled
with a semi-Markov process, whose embedded Markov chain is shown in Figure 4·7.
We denote by Xj(ω) the average number of packets transmitted during each visit to
state j and by pij(ω) the steady-state proportion of transitions into state j. Since
the process is irreducible and ergodic, according to Theorem 7.2 in (Medhi, 2012), we





Based on Equation (4.5), we next provide expressions for pij(ω) and Xj(ω). We
first consider pij(ω). The embedded Markov chain of the transitions of the bit rates is
depicted in Figure 4·7. We denote T+j (ω) and T−j (ω) to be the transition probabilities
from state j to states j + 1 and j − 1, respectively.
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if j > 1.
(4.6)
We next derive the transition probabilities T+j (ω) and T
−
j (ω). The operation of
ARF at bit rate bj (1 < j < N) is shown in Figure 4·8. States Sjk and Sj−k (k > 0)
represent the states where k consecutive packets are transmitted successfully and
unsuccessfully at bit rate bj, respectively. The initial state is S
j
0. Thus, the transition
probability T+j (ω) is the probability that that the process reaches state S
j
s before
state Sj−f , starting from state S
j
0.
Proposition 4. Given L(ω), the transition probability from state j to state j + 1 is
T+j (ω) =
{
1 if j = 1,
(1−L(ω))s∑f−1k=0 L(ω)k
1−∑s−1k=1(1−L(ω))k∑f−1k=1 L(ω)k if 1 < j < N, (4.7)
and the transition probability from state j to state j − 1 is
T−j (ω) =
{
1− T+j (ω) if 1 < j < N,
1 if j = N.
(4.8)
Based on Propositions 2, 3 and 4, the steady-state proportion of transitions into
state j, namely pij(ω), can be expressed as a function of the utilization limit ω. The
following proposition states that the average number of consecutive packet attempts
transmitted at bit rate bj, namely Xj(ω), can also be expressed as a function of ω.
Proposition 5. Given the packet loss L(ω), the average number of consecutive pack-














if j = N.
(4.9)
Plugging the results of Propositions 2, 3, 4, and 5 into Equation (4.5), we finally
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Figure 4·7: Embedded Markov chain of the semi-Markov process
which represents the transitions of the bit rates operated by ARF. State
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Figure 4·8: Markov model of ARF at an intermediate bit rate bj
(1 < j < N). States Sjk and S
j
−k represent k consecutive successful and
failed transmission attempts, respectively.
obtain an expression for the fraction of packets transmitted at each bit rate bj, that
is αj, as a function of the utilization limit ω and the parameters s, f , and N of the
ARF algorithm.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we demonstrate the feasibility of launching cascading attacks in Wi-Fi
networks with weakly interfering hidden nodes. We observe that weak interference
due to hidden nodes can cause significant packet losses due to the receiver capture
effect. We validate and contrast the impact of the classical capture effect and that of
the receiver capture effect through both analysis and simulation. We show that while
the capture effect is sensitive to the SIR and bit rate, the receiver capture effect is
insensitive to either of those. Our analysis shows that the receiver capture effect can
yield a packet loss rate as high as 50% under high utilization.
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Packet losses caused by receiver capture force rate adaptation algorithms to lower
their bit rate and induce traffic congestion. Through ns-3 simulations for various
rate adaptation algorithms and based on realistic channel models, we show that this
coupling between neighboring cells propagates across a network. In fact, a small
increase in the traffic generated by the attacker can reduce the bit rate and create
congestion across a whole network.
Through simulation and analysis, we also investigate the behavior of a large net-
work implementing the ARF algorithm. We find that the operational bit rate of ARF
drops sharply as the packet loss rate increases. In fact, the bit rate is brought down
to 1 Mb/s when the packet loss rate is above 40%, which is lower than the highest
possible packet loss rate due to the receiver capture effect. We find that if the uti-
lization of nodes in the networks is higher than 20%, the average bit rate is reduced
to close to 1 Mb/s. We further show that the utilization and bit rate converge to
limits in a large network, and establish a relationship between these two quantities
that match well the simulation results.
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Chapter 5
Mitigation of Cascading Attacks
5.1 Motivation
In previous chapters, we demonstrated cascading DoS attacks on Wi-Fi networks.
This attack exploits an interference coupling phenomenon (Xin et al., 2016) between
neighboring cells of IEEE 802.11 networks, which is induced by hidden nodes. Using
interference coupling, an attacker can locally raise the amount of traffic that it gener-
ates and affect its neighboring cells, which in turn affect their own neighboring cells
and so on. As a result, the transmitting queue of a distant node can suddenly be
brought into instability and get congested. The attack is feasible in both infrastruc-
ture and ad-hoc networks, under certain configurations. Moreover, since the attack
can be launched remotely and is protocol compliant, it makes it difficult to locate
and identify the attacker. Given the serious consequences of cascading DoS attacks,
it is important to find methods to mitigate them.
In this chapter, we focus on the mitigation of cascading DoS attacks in Wi-Fi
networks. Our key idea is to optimize the durations of packet transmissions (or,
equivalently, the packet length divided by the bit rate) in order to ensure that in-
terference coupling does not propagate and amplify. To achieve this goal, we show
that it is essential to properly model the impact of MAC overhead, and in particular
MAC timing parameters. We propose a new theoretical model where we relate the
utilization of nodes in neighboring cells using iterative equations. We then perform
a fixed point analysis to characterize the limiting behavior of the sequence of node
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utilizations and the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS attack against a Wi-Fi
network.
Our main contributions are as follows. We first show how to set the packet du-
ration in order to avoid a cascading DoS attack, namely to prevent the initial value
of the sequence of node utilizations (which can be set by the attacker) to affect the
limit of the sequence. Second, we show that it is possible to simultaneously optimize
the packet duration in order to achieve maximum throughput. Third, we validate
the analytical results using ns-3 simulations, including for an office building model
with and without the cross traffic. Fourth, we setup an experimental testbed with
real Wi-Fi cards to demonstrate the mitigation of the attack. A key insight obtained
from our analysis, simulation, and experiment is that IEEE 802.11 networks with
relatively large MAC overhead (e.g., IEEE 802.11b) are less susceptible to cascad-
ing DoS attacks than networks with smaller overhead (e.g., IEEE 802.11g and IEEE
802.11n). We also show that our method achieves higher throughput performance
than the RTS/CTS method, especially at high bit rates.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we explain how
cascading DoS attacks operate and the impact of the packet length on the feasibility
of launching such attacks. In Section 5.3, we introduce our analytical model, derive a
sufficient condition for preventing cascading DoS attacks, and show how to optimally
set packet durations in order to maximize throughput performance. We present our
simulation results in Section 5.4 and investigate the performance of the mitigation in







cell 1 cell 2 cell i cell i+1
Figure 5·1: Network configuration. The dotted circles represent the
communication range of nodes Ai. Nodes Ai transmit packets to nodes
Bi (i = 1, 2, . . .). Each transmission pair (Ai, Bi) belongs to a different
cell. Nodes Ai are hidden nodes with respect to nodes Ai+1.
5.2 Cascading DoS Attacks
5.2.1 Attack scenario
We next explain how a cascading DoS attack can unfold. We consider a network
configuration consisting of a chain of N pairs of nodes. Figure 5·1 depicts the con-
figuration. The ith pair is denoted (Ai, Bi), where i ≥ 1. Each node Ai transmits
packets to node Bi (one-hop communication). Furthermore, each node Ai is a hidden
node with respect to node Ai+1, which means that node Ai cannot sense a trans-
mission by node Ai+1. If a transmission by node Ai overlaps with a transmission by
node Ai+1, a packet collision occurs at node Bi+1. This collision forces node Ai+1 to
retransmit its packet using the procedure described in Section 2.1.1.
In this configuration, suppose node A1 (the attacker) starts increasing the rate at
which it generates packets and transmits them over the channel (in compliance with
the IEEE 802.11 standard). These transmissions will cause collisions at node B2,
which forces node A2 to increase the rate at which it attempts to transmit packets over
the channel (due to retransmissions). The increased rate of transmission attempts by
A2 will in turn impact pair (A3, B3) and so forth. Under certain conditions, this effect
may amplify along the chain and cause a large fraction of transmission attempts to fail
and result in unstable queues (i.e., the rate at which nodes can successfully transmit













Figure 5·2: Example of an attack in an office building. Three trans-
mission pairs (Ai, Bi), where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are positioned as shown in
the figure.
5.2.2 Example
To help motivate the rest of this chapter, we next present an example to illustrate
the occurrence of a cascading DoS attack in a practical scenario, as well as a way
to prevent it. Define ρi as the offered load at node i, that is, the rate at which it
generates packets multiplied by the transmission duration of each packet. Further,
define the utilization of node Ai as the average fraction of time during which node
Ai is transmitting, and the throughput of node Ai as the average number of bits per
second that node Ai successfully transmits to node Bi.
As shown in Figure 5·2, we consider communication within an office building using
the ns-3 building model (ns-3, 2018). The external wall of the building is made of
concrete with windows. The internal wall loss is 12 dB (Afaqui et al., 2015). All the
other parameters are set to default. In the following two examples, we consider an
IEEE 802.11g/n network composed of N = 3 pairs of nodes and communicating using
UDP (examples of realistic applications using UDP include Google Chromecast and
Apple TV).
The nodes are located in every other room, as shown in Figure 5·2. Each trans-
mitting node uses a short slot time (i.e., Tslot = 9 µs) and a bit rate of 6 Mb/s. The
offered load at nodes A2 and A3 is set to 0.14 while the attacker A1 varies its load ρ1.
We run simulations of this configuration using the ns-3 simulator (ns-3, 2018). The
running time of each simulation is 200 seconds and the plotted results are averages
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computed over three independent runs.
In the first example, we set the packet length to 1500 bytes. Simulation results
illustrating the cascading attack are depicted in Figure 5·3. We observe that as node
A1 starts to transmit after 50 s, the utilization of node A3 suddenly jumps from about
0.25 to 0.65 due to packet collisions and retransmissions. As a result, its throughput
drops from about 0.75 Mb/s to 0.5 Mb/s. The utilization and throughput of node A3
recovers once node A1 stops transmitting after 150 s.
Now consider the same setting, but with packets of length 200 bytes. The offered
load of nodes A2 and A3 is maintained the same as in the previous example (by
increasing the packet generation rate). In that case, we observe that increased traffic
generation by node A1 has no effect on the utilization and throughput of node A3.
This result holds no matter what packet length is used by the attacker.
Chapter 3 only considers the impact of the traffic load and the retry limit on
the feasibility of a cascading attack. Figure 5·3 clearly shows that this is insufficient
and that other parameters (e.g., the packet length) need to be taken into account.
In the next section, we present and analyze a model that incorporates these other
parameters.
5.3 Mitigation of Cascading Attacks: Model and Analysis
We propose an analytical model to find out how to mitigate a cascading DoS attack
against an IEEE 802.11 network. The proposed model captures key system param-
eters, including the offered load, the packet duration (i.e., the packet length divided
by the bit rate), and MAC parameters. We consider the network configuration shown
in Fig. 5·1, since it is a configuration for which it is known that cascading attacks are
feasible. The analysis captures the coupling between the utilizations of neighboring






Figure 5·3: Feasibility of cascading DoS attacks in IEEE 802.11g/n
networks of an office building. When nodes in the network use 1500
bytes packets, node A1 can launch a cascading DoS attack. When
node A1 is transmitting, node A3 suffers from low throughput and high
channel utilization. However, this attack is prevented when nodes use
200 bytes packets.
fixed point analysis to determine the limit of the sequence, as a function of the initial
condition (i.e., the utilization of the first node in the chain, which is the attacker).
Our goal is to determine when the initial value of the sequence of utilization is guar-
anteed to have no influence on the limit of the sequence (that is, the utilization of
remote nodes) for all possible traffic loads.
5.3.1 Model and assumptions
We now present our model, notation, and assumptions. We denote by λ1 the packet
generation rate at node A1 (the attacker) and by λi = λ the packet generation rate
at all the other nodes Ai (i ≥ 2). The duration of a packet transmission is T (we
assume a fixed bit rate). The offered load at node A1 is ρ1 = λ1T and the offered
load at all the other nodes is ρ = λT . The average number of transmissions for each
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packet at node Ai (i.e., the average retry count) is denoted ri. Note that r1 = 1. The
probability that a packet transmitted by node Ai collides is denoted pi. Finally, we
denote by µi the service capacity of the channel, that is the maximum average rate at
which packets (both new and retransmissions) can be transmitted over the channel.
In the sequel, we derive expressions for ri, pi and µi.
The utilization of node Ai (i.e., the fraction of time during which it transmits)
is denoted ui. If riλi < µi, then the queue of node Ai is stable and by Little’s
Law (Kleinrock, 1975) its utilization is riλiT . On the other hand, If riλi > µi, then
the queue of node Ai is unstable and its utilization is µiT . We refer to µiT as the
congested utilization. Hence, the utilization of node Ai (i ≥ 1) is
ui = min{riλiT, µiT}. (5.1)
In order to render the analysis of this queueing network tractable, we make use of
Kleinrock’s random look assumption (Kleinrock et al., 1975), namely:
1. The probability pi that a packet transmitted by node Ai collides is independent
of previous attempts.
2. Packet transmissions and retransmissions at each nodeAi form a Poisson process
with rate min{riλi, µi}.
We emphasize that beside these approximations, the rest of the analysis is exact. Note
that a key difference between the analysis conducted in this chapter and Chapter 3 is
that we develop a method to characterize the congested utilization (see Lemma 14).
Because the congested utilization is smaller than 1, the structure of the iterative
sequence (see Eq. (5.10)) and the analysis of its limits (see Sections 5.3.3 to 5.3.5)
are markedly different from the results derived in Chapter 3.
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5.3.2 Iterative analysis
In this section, we derive iterative equations for relating the utilizations of neighboring
pairs of nodes. The following lemma provides expressions for pi and ri. The proof
follows similar lines as the derivations of Equations (3.8) and (3.6) in Section 3.4.2.
Lemma 12. For i ≥ 2,






Using the above lemma, one can obtain an expression for the average utilization
of a node with a stable queue.









We next provide an expression for the congested utilization of a node with an
unstable queue.

















r and pi are given by Equations (2.3), (2.4) and (5.2) respectively.
Proof. Define the backoff cycle of a packet as the time it takes for that packet to
be successfully transmitted during a back-off procedure or dropped after R failed
retransmissions. We note that the lengths of backoff cycles of different packets are
independent, due to Assumption 1 and the fact that the contention window is reset at
the beginning of each cycle. Hence, the backoff process of consecutive packets forms a
regenerative process (Ross, 1996), which implies that the average utilization of node
Ai is the ratio of the average time during which node Ai transmits during a backoff
cycle to the average length of a backoff cycle.
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Now, the fact that node Ai retransmits a packet for the rth time implies that all
the previous r − 1 retransmissions failed due to packet collisions caused by a hidden
node. Hence, the probability that node Ai transmits a packet at least r times is p
r−1
i




The average time that node Ai spends on the rth retransmission is d
(s)
r (1− pi) +
d
(f)





r (1− pi) + d(f)r pi + T ). (5.6)
Taking the ratio of Eq. (5.5) to Eq. (5.6) gives the result stated by the lemma.
To simply notation in the rest of the analysis, we define the following functions
based on Lemmas 12, 13 and 14:
P (ui−1) , pi = 1− e−ui−1(1− ui−1); (5.7)













r−1(d(s)r (1− pi) + d(f)r pi + T ))
. (5.9)
Substituting (5.8) and (5.9) into (5.1), we obtain the following relationship be-
tween the utilizations of nodes Ai and Ai−1:
ui = min {U(ui−1), S(ui−1)} . (5.10)
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5.3.3 Limiting behavior and fixed points
We next characterize the limiting behavior of the sequence of utilizations, using the
concept of fixed points. We then formalize the notion of a cascading DoS attack, and
obtain a sufficient condition for preventing it.
Consider the possible limits of the utilization sequence {ui}∞i=1. These limits rep-
resent fixed points of the iteration (5.10).
Definition 4 (Fixed point). We say that ω ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed point of (5.10) if
ω = min {U(ω), S(ω)} . (5.11)
We next define the two possible types of fixed points.
Definition 5 (Congested and uncongested fixed points). Let
ωˇ = U(ωˇ). (5.12)
If ωˇ also satisfies (5.11), we say that ωˇ is an uncongested fixed point. Likewise, let
ωˆ = S(ωˆ). (5.13)
If ωˆ also satisfies (5.11), then we say that ωˆ is a congested fixed point.
Based on the property of a fixed point (i.e., congested or uncongested), we define
next whether a network is congested or not.
Definition 6 (Network congestion). A network is said to be uncongested if the limit
of the utilization sequence {ui}∞i=1 is an uncongested fixed point ωˇ. Otherwise, if the
limit of the utilization sequence {ui}∞i=1 is a congested fixed point ωˆ, then the network
is said to be congested.
Using the above notions, we now formally define a cascading DoS attack.
Definition 7 (Cascading DoS attack). A cascading DoS attack occurs when changing
u1 causes the network to change its state from uncongested to congested.
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We conclude that an attack is feasible only if the utilization sequence has both
uncongested and congested fixed points. If for each possible value of the offered traffic
load ρ, (5.11) has only one type of fixed points, then a cascading DoS attack can never
be launched on the network (assuming that all the other network parameters remain
fixed).
In the following, we show that the value of ωˆ plays a key role in determining
the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS attack. Specifically, we show that if
ωˆ ≤ (3−√5)/2, then (5.11) has only one type of fixed points for each traffic load ρ
and a cascading DoS attack is unfeasible. In Section 5.3.6, we further show that if
ωˆ = (3−√5)/2, then the network achieves the highest possible congestion throughput.
5.3.4 Existence of fixed points
We now investigate the existence of the two types of fixed points (uncongested and
congested) in Equation (5.11). We first show that if a congested fixed point exists,
then it is unique.
Before prove that, we provide the following lemmas.
Lemma 15. If b ≥ a, then the function f(x) = a+xb
1+x
is monotonically increasing in
x.
Proof. Let b > a. The derivative of function f(x) is
f ′(x) =














































We next to prove whether the lemma is also correct at R+ 1. If so, we can prove the

























































































Based on the above two lemmas, we present the following theorem to show the
uniqueness of the value of ωˆ.
Lemma 17. Eq. (5.13) has a unique solution ωˆ.
Proof. We show that the function F (ω) , S(ω) − ω is continuous and strictly de-
creasing in the interval [0, 1] with F (0) > 0 and F (1) < 0. Therefore, according to the
intermediate value theorem (Szecsei, 2007), there exists a unique solution F (ωˆ) = 0
(i.e., S(ωˆ) = ωˆ).
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According to (5.7), P (0) = 0. Therefore,













Since S(ω) is always strictly smaller than 1 (due to the MAC timing constants that
only appear in the denominator), we have
F (1) = S(1)− 1 < 0.









− 1 < 0.
The derivative of P (ω) is
dP (ω)
dω
= e−ω(1− ω) + e−ω = e−ω(2− ω) > 0.
We next prove that dS(ω)
dP (ω)
is negative for all ω ∈ [0, 1], which proves the result. That
is, S(ω) decreases as P (ω) increases.
Since Sω ≥ 0, the function S(ω) is decreasing if and only if S(ω)−1 is increasing.
































and 1. If all those three terms are non-increasing functions of
P (ω) and at least one of them is increasing, then S(ω)−1 is increasing with P (ω). Since














P (ω)(df,r − ds,r)
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(5.15)








r(TDIFS + T backoff,r + TSIFS + TACK)∑R−1
r=0 (P (ω))
rT
Since T backoff,r is an increasing sequence in r and TDIFS + TSIFS + TACK is constant,






increases with P (ω). We derive
that S(ω)−1 increases as P (ω) decreases, which proves the result.
We next determine when a congested fixed point exists at ωˆ, for a given traffic
load ρ. Based on (5.11), such a fixed point must satisfy






r=1 (1− e−ω(1− ω))r−1
. (5.17)
The following lemma follows directly from (5.16) and (5.17).
Lemma 18. A congested fixed point exists at ωˆ if and only if ρ ≥ G(ωˆ).
Proof. We construct a chain of iff implications, starting with the statement that the
fixed point ωˆ exists. Based on Equation (5.11), this property holds iff
ωˆ ≤ U(ωˆ).





The following lemma establishes when an uncongested fixed point exists.
Lemma 19. An uncongested fixed point exists if and only if ρ ≤ maxω∈[0,ωˆ] G(ω).
Proof. We prove that the existence of an uncongested fixed point implies ρ ≤ maxω∈[0,ωˆ] G(ω)
and vice-versa. On one hand, suppose an uncongested fixed point ωˇ exists. According
to Definition 5, the uncongested fixed point ωˇ satisfies
ωˇ = min{U(ωˇ), S(ωˇ)} = U(ωˇ), (5.18)
and the congested fixed point ωˆ satisfies
ωˆ = min{U(ωˆ), S(ωˆ)} = S(ωˆ). (5.19)
Since Lemma 17 shows that the congested fixed point ωˆ is unique, we replace S(ωˇ)
in (5.18) by ωˆ. We thus have
ωˇ = min{U(ω), ωˆ} = U(ω) ≤ ωˆ. (5.20)




= G(ωˇ) ≤ max
ω∈[0,ωˆ]
G(ω). (5.21)
On the other hand, let ρ ≤ maxω∈[0,ωˆ] G(ω). Since G(0) = 0, for any ω ∈ [0, ωˆ], it
satisfies
0 ≤ G(ω) ≤ max
ω∈[0,ωˆ]
G(ω).
Besides, G(ω) is continuous at the interval ω ∈ [0, ωˆ]. According to the intermediate
value theorem (Szecsei, 2007), if ρ ∈ [0,maxω∈[0,ωˆ] G(ω)], then there exists at least one
ω ∈ [0, ωˆ] such that ρ = G(ω). According to (5.17), that ω also satisfies ω = U(ω),
which represents an uncongested fixed point.
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5.3.5 Avoidance of cascading DoS attacks
We next establish a sufficient condition to avoid a cascading DoS attack on a network.
According to Definition 7, a cascading DoS attack is unfeasible if Equation (5.11) has
only one type of fixed points (i.e., either uncongested or congested) for each ρ. Hence,
we provide the following lemma.
Lemma 20. If G(ωˆ) > G(ω) for all ω ∈ [0, ωˆ), then Equation (5.11) has only one
type of fixed points for each traffic load ρ > 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemma 18 and 19. When ρ > G(ωˆ), only a
congested fixed point exists, while when ρ < G(ωˆ), only one (or more) uncongested
fixed points exist. Note that in the special case ρ = G(ωˆ) , there exists a unique fixed
point ωˆ that is both congested and uncongested since U(ωˆ) = S(ωˆ). This boundary
case is similar to when the server load equals 1 in a queueing system. Nevertheless,








We now state our first main result.
Theorem 21 (Prevention of cascading attacks). A cascading DoS attack is unfeasible
if ωˆ ≤ α, where ωˆ is the unique solution of (5.12) and α is given by (5.22).
Proof. Using algebra, the function G(ω) can be shown to be strictly increasing in the
interval [0, α]. The result then follows by Lemma 20.
The above theorem implies that an attacker cannot launch a cascading DoS attack,
if ωˆ is kept sufficiently low.
5.3.6 Optimizing the congestion throughput
In this section, we optimize the packet duration to achieve the highest throughput
performance when the network is congested. We remind that the throughput of node
92
Ai is defined as the average number of bits per second that it successfully transmits to
node Bi (this quantity is also sometimes referred to as goodput in the literature). The
congestion throughput is the throughput of a node when packets are always waiting
in its queue (i.e., when the queue is unstable). The congestion throughput can be
found by taking the product of the congested utilization with the probability that
a packet does not get lost. As i get large (i.e., looking at a node far down in the
chain), the congested utilization of node Ai converges to S(ωˆ) = ωˆ and the packet
loss probability converges to P (ωˆ), where the functions P (·) and S(·) are defined in
Eqs. (5.7) and (5.9), respectively. The congestion throughput is therefore given by
X(ωˆ) , (1− P (ωˆ)) · ωˆ
= e−ωˆ(1− ωˆ) · ωˆ. (5.23)
Eq. (5.23) implies that the congestion throughput X(ωˆ) does not always increase
with ωˆ. The following theorem determines the value of ωˆ that optimizes X(ωˆ).
Theorem 22 (Optimal congestion throughput). The maximum congestion through-
put is achieved at ωˆ = α, where α is given by (5.22).
Proof. Let ωˆ ∈ [0, 1]. According to (5.23), the derivative of X(ωˆ) is
X ′(ωˆ) = e−ωˆ(1− 3ωˆ + ωˆ2). (5.24)
There exists a unique solution of the equation X ′(ωˆ) = 0 at ωˆ = α. Since the second
order derivative of X(ωˆ) is negative at ωˆ = α, that is,
X ′′(α) = e−α(−4 + 5α− α2) < 0,
we conclude that X(α) is the maximum of X(ωˆ) in the interval ωˆ ∈ [0, 1].
Combined with Theorem 21, we obtain the remarkable result that ωˆ = α both
prevents cascading DoS attacks and maximizes the congestion throughput.
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By setting ωˆ = α, we can calculate the optimal packet duration T ∗ that maximizes






r−1(d(s)r (1− P (α)) + d(f)r P (α))
(1− α)∑Rr=1(P (α))r−1 . (5.25)
Note that for any bit rate, the optimal packet length can be found by multiplying the
optimal packet duration with the bit rate.
According to (5.25), the optimal packet duration is affected by the MAC overhead
parameters. In particular, the optimal packet duration in IEEE 802.11b networks is
longer than in 802.11g/n networks. Using the parameters shown in Table 2.1 the
optimal packet duration in IEEE 802.11b is T ∗ = 1.10 ms, while in IEEE 802.11g/n
with long slot time T ∗ = 0.65 ms and with short slot time T ∗ = 0.27 ms.
5.4 Simulation Results
We next present simulation results using ns-3 (ns-3, 2018). We first demonstrate the
importance of properly modeling MAC timing parameters in the context of cascading
DoS attacks (the impact of the packet length was shown in Section 5.2.2). We then
validate the accuracy of our analytical model in predicting the congested utilization of
a network. Next, we verify Theorems 21 and 22, and compare the performance of our
method (based on optimizing the packet duration) to an RTS/CTS-based method.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the mitigation in an office building scenario
with cross traffic. All the simulations shown in this section assume that the retry
limit R is set to 7 and nodes communicate using UDP. Each simulation is run for 200
seconds and the plotted results are averages computed over three independent runs.
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5.4.1 Impact of MAC timing parameters
We compare the behavior of IEEE 802.11g/n networks using respectively a long slot
time (i.e., Tslot = 20 µs) and a short slot time (i.e., Tslot = 9 µs). All the other system
parameters are identical. The network contains 20 pairs of nodes (see Fig. 5·1). Each
node Ai transmits 1500 bytes packets at 6 Mb/s bit rate to node Bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 20).
The offered load of nodes Ai (i ≥ 2) is set to ρ = 0.14.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5·4. When the network uses a short
slot time, the utilization of node A20 jumps when the offered load of the attacker
ρ1 exceeds 0.5. Hence, a cascading DoS attack occurs in that case. However, when
the network uses a long slot time, the utilization of node A20 is not affected. This
result confirms that the MAC configuration has an important impact on the possible
occurrence of a cascading DoS attack. Because a network using a short slot time
has a higher congested utilization than a network using a long slot time it is more
vulnerable to a cascading DoS attack, assuming that all the other parameters are
fixed.
5.4.2 Model accuracy
We next check if the value of the congested fixed point ωˆ, as given by Eq. (5.13), pre-
dicts well the limit of the sequence of node utilizations when the network is congested.
An accurate estimation of ωˆ is crucial for Theorems 21 and 22.
We run ns-3 simulations with 50 pairs of nodes. To ensure that the network
is congested, the offered load ρ is set to 0.98. Fig. 5·5 depicts the utilization of
node A50 for different bit rates and packet lengths. Fig. 5·5(a) shows results for an
IEEE 802.11b configuration while Fig. 5·5(b) shows results for an IEEE 802.11g/n
with short slot time. Both figures show excellent match between the analytical and
simulation results. In both cases, the congested utilization decreases with the bit rate
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Figure 5·4: IEEE 802.11g/n networks under different MAC configu-
rations. With a short slot time Tslot = 9 µs, a cascading DoS attack
occurs. However, the attack does not occur if the network uses a long
slot time Tslot = 20 µs.
but increases with the packet length. This is expected since the overhead of MAC
timing parameters remains constant. Likewise, for a given bit rate and packet length,
the congested utilization of IEEE 802.11g/n is higher than that of IEEE 802.11b, due
to the lower MAC overhead of IEEE 802.11g/n. While such a property is generally
viewed as desirable, it makes a network more vulnerable to a cascading DoS attack
as explained previously.
5.4.3 Empirical validation of Theorems 21 and 22
We finally empirically validate our main results, namely that if ωˆ = α then a cas-
cading DoS attack is unfeasible for all traffic loads and the congestion throughput
is maximized. To achieve the desired congested utilization α, we compute the theo-
retically optimal packet length by taking the product of the optimal packet duration
given by Eq. (5.25) with the bit rate.
All our simulations, run for different bit rates and MAC configuration (e.g., IEEE
802.11b and IEEE 802.11g/n), show that no cascading attack occurs when the packet
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Analysis: 1500 bytes packet
Simulation: 1500 bytes packet
Analysis: 500 bytes packet
Simulation: 500 bytes packet
(a) 802.11b.


























Analysis: 1500 bytes packet
Simulation: 1500 bytes packet
Analysis: 500 bytes packet
Simulation: 500 bytes packet
(b) IEEE 802.11g/n.
Figure 5·5: Congested utilization: comparison of analytical and sim-
ulation results.
length is set optimally. For instance, for a bit rate of 6 Mb/s, the optimal packet
length is 200 bytes. In that case, Fig. 5·3, which was introduced in Section 5.2.2,
shows that the network experiences a cascading attack if the packet length is 1500
bytes and ρ = 0.14. On the other hand, an attacker cannot cause a cascading attack
if the packet length is 200 bytes.
Next, we run simulations to evaluate the congestion throughput of the network
using the optimal packet length. We set up a congested network consisting of 20 pairs
of nodes with ρ = 0.98. We consider a 802.11g/n network using a long slot time. We
compare the congestion throughput obtained using the theoretically optimal packet
length, based on Eq. (5.25), with the maximum congestion throughput obtained em-
pirically for 22 different packet lengths, that is, 100, 200, . . . , 2200 bytes. We also
compare the results when enabling RTS/CTS with packets of length 500 bytes and
1500 bytes.
Figure 5·6 shows the congestion throughput of node A20 at different bit rates.
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Empirically optimal pkt length
Theoretically optimal pkt length
RTS/CTS w/ 1500 bytes pkts
RTS/CTS w/ 500 bytes pkts
Figure 5·6: Comparison of congestion throughput in IEEE 802.11g/n,
based on the theoretically optimal packet length, empirically optimal
packet length, and RTS/CTS.
We observe that the congestion throughput obtained using the theoretically optimal
packet length is close to the maximum congestion throughput obtained empirically
over the 22 different packet lengths. Moreover, the congestion throughput is always
higher than that obtained when using RTS/CTS and the difference becomes more
significant as the bit rate increases. When the bit rate is 54 Mb/s, the congestion
throughput obtained when using the optimal packet length is 2.5 times higher than
that obtained when using 1500 bytes packets in conjunction with RTS/CTS.
5.4.4 Topology with cross traffic
We present the simulation results to evaluate the performance of the mitigation in an
office building scenario with the cross traffic. We consider the communication within
an office building using the same ns-3 building model as in Section 5.2.2. As shown
in Figure 5·7, we create one floor of office building with 3 rows of rooms and each row
has 11 rooms. We use location (x, y) to present each room where x ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 10}.
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We consider the cascading attacks on three transmission pairs (Ai, Bi), i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
which are positioned in every other room of the middle row. Node A1 is the attacker
and the other two pairs are victims. Additionally, there are four other transmission
pairs (Cj, Dj), j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The transmitters Cj are positioned at rooms (0, 2),
(0, 6), (2, 4), (2, 8) and their receivers Dj are positioned at rooms (0, 4), (0, 8), (2, 2),
(2, 6), respectively. We vary the offered load at node A1 and set the offered load at
nodes A2 and A3 to 0.12 and nodes Cj to 0.06 for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. All the nodes
transmit UDP packets at 6 Mb/s bit rate. The running time of each simulation is
200 s.
We first set the packet length to 1500 bytes and illustrate the feasibility of the
cascading attack in Figure 5·8. We observe that as node A1 starts to transmit after
50 s, the utilization of node A3 increases from 0.2 to 0.45. Its throughput drops from
0.73 Mb/s to less than 0.6 Mb/s. The utilization and throughput of node A3 recovers
once node A1 stops transmitting after 150 s. The cascading attack is feasible in this
simulation.
We then demonstrate the mitigation of cascading DoS attacks by changing the
packet length to 200 bytes. When node A1 is transmitting, we observe that the
utilization of node A1 does not increase as shown in Figure 5·8(a). Meanwhile, the
throughput of node A3 does not change shown in Figure 5·8(b). This result shows
that cascading attacks are still feasible in the topology with cross traffic and our
mitigation still works.
5.5 Mitigation in Experimental Testbed
In this section, we provide experiment results to show that shortening packet length
can prevent the occurrence of the cascading attacks in Wi-Fi networks. The idea
































Figure 5·8: Cascading attack and its mitigation in a network topology
with cross traffic.
settings except the packet length. When the testbed uses the long packet length
for transmissions, the cascading attacks are feasible. However, the attacks disappear
when the testbed uses the short packet length instead.
We set up an experimental testbed as shown in Figure 5·9. We establish an
IEEE 802.11n ad hoc network consisting of three transmission pairs (Ai, Bi), where
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Each node Ai or Bi consists of a PC and a TP-LINK TL-WN772N Wi-
Fi USB adapter. We use RF cables to link the nodes and use splinters to split and
combine the Wi-Fi signals. As shown in the figure, we add 60 dB attenuators on the
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links (Ai, Bi+1) and 70 dB attenuators on the links (Ai, Bi). We set the transmission
power of all the nodes to 0 dBm. Thus, node Ai is a hidden node with respect to
node Ai+1. Meanwhile, the received signal (interference) strength at node Bi from
the hidden node Ai−1 is stronger than the signal strength from node Ai. This makes
sure that the interference due to hidden node Ai−1 is able to corrupt the packet
transmissions between Ai and Bi.
The goal is to test whether the increase of the traffic at the link (A1, B1) will affect
the throughput at the link (A3, B3). The links (A1, B1) and (A3, B3) do not interfere
each other directly. If we observe the throughput at the link (A3, B3) reduces due to
the increase of the traffic at the link (A1, B1), then the cascading attack is feasible.
Note that though we wire the nodes together, the nodes in the testbed can still receive
the packets from outside. Therefore, the experiment results are also affected by the
cross traffic.
In the experiments, we set the packet lengths to 500 bytes and 1500 bytes. Note
that these two packet lengths are not optimal according to our mitigation. This is
because the Wi-Fi cards use adaptive bit rates instead of fixed bit rate. However, our
mitigation optimizes the packet duration. The optimal packet lengths vary by the
bit rates. Since the Wi-Fi cards are closed-source, we are not able to set the optimal
packet length at each bit rate.
The experiment results are illustrated in Figure 5·10. We first let node Ai trans-
mit 1500 bytes packets to node Bi, where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and illustrate the results in
Figure 5·10(a). We observe that when node A1 starts to transmit after 50 s, the
throughput of nodes A2 and A3 drops from 400 Kb/s to 100 Kb/s. When node A1
stops transmitting after 100 s, the throughput of nodes A2 and A3 recovers. We
then set the packet length to 500 bytes and repeat the experiment. As shown in Fig-









Figure 5·9: Experimental testbed.
Node A1 transmits
(a) Attack is feasible when
nodes transmit 1500 bytes
packets.
Node A1 transmits
(b) Attack is unfeasible when
nodes transmit 500 bytes
packets.
Figure 5·10: Feasibility assessment of a cascading DoS attack in the
experimental testbed.
of the other nodes. This result shows that the attack is feasible when the network
transmits 1500 bytes packets but unfeasible when the packet length is shortened to
500 bytes. This result shows that the cascading attack can be avoided by shortening
the packet length in real Wi-Fi networks.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose, analyze, and simulate a method to prevent cascading DoS
attacks against Wi-Fi networks. When a cascading DoS attack is feasible, a small
change in the offered load of the attacker can lead the network to suddenly transition
from stability to instability. Our method derives the optimal packet length to prevent
such change to ever occur for any traffic load. Moreover, for the same packet length,
we show that the network achieves the maximum congestion throughput performance
possible.
Specifically, we provide an analytical model to predict the feasibility of a cascading
DoS attack. We develop an iterative analysis that characterizes the sequence of node
utilizations, and use fixed point techniques to study its limiting behavior. We show
that two types of fixed points may arise: uncongested fixed points and congested fixed
points. We show that if the congested fixed point exists, it is unique. We further show
that if the value of the congested fixed point ωˆ is lower or equal to (3−√5)/2 ≈ 0.38,
then a cascading attack is unfeasible. In this case, the sequence of node utilizations
can only converge to one type of fixed points, no matter what is the initial value of
the sequence set by the attacker. The analysis captures the effect of MAC overhead
parameters on the feasibility of launching a cascading DoS attack. For instance, with
all other parameters kept fixed, we showed that an IEEE 802.11g/n network using a
short slot time is more vulnerable to a cascading DoS attack than an IEEE 802.11g/n
network using a long slot time.
Our mitigation method simultaneously optimizes the throughput performance
of the network. Indeed, the analysis shows that when the congested utilization is
ωˆ = (3 −√5)/2, the network achieves the highest congestion throughput. Our sim-
ulation results validate that the throughput performance of the network using the
theoretically optimal packet length indeed approaches the highest possible through-
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put and that it is higher (sometimes significantly) than the throughput obtained
using RTS/CTS. We also provide the simulation results to investigate the impact of




In this dissertation, we investigate and demonstrate cascading DoS attacks in Wi-Fi
networks. The attack starts with increasing the traffic load of one node in the network,
the effect of which propagates through the network due to interference coupling, and
results in global congestion of the network. Since this attack is remotely launched
and protocol-compliant, it makes it harder to identify or locate the attacker.
We first show that a cascading DoS attack can be launched by exploiting the vul-
nerability of the CSMA mechanism in the MAC layer of IEEE 802.11 protocols. Since
the RTS/CTS mechanism is generally turned off by default, the CSMA mechanism is
vulnerable to the hidden node problem. The hidden nodes create an interference cou-
pling effect between neighboring cells which facilitates the propagation of the attack.
We show that the parameter retry limit plays an important role in the feasibility of
the attack. The attack is feasible only when the retry limit is greater than 7.
We then unveil another vulnerability, namely the receiver capture effect at the
physical layer of Wi-Fi. Under the receiver capture effect, a receiver aligns its state
machine with information provided by the PHY header of the first transmission,
before the second packet arrives. By exploiting the receiver capture effect, weak
interference due to a hidden node can corrupt packet transmissions with strong power.
This creates an interference coupling effect between neighboring cells. A cascading
DoS attack becomes then feasible, forcing nodes in the network to operate at low bit
rate.
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We last propose a method to prevent cascading DoS attacks against Wi-Fi net-
works. Our method analytically derives the optimal packet length to prevent such
change to ever occur for any traffic load. Moreover, for the same packet length, we
show that the network achieves the maximum congestion throughput performance
possible.
6.1 Future work
In the following, we discuss future directions of the research extending from this
dissertation.
6.1.1 Coupling vulnerability
Exploiting the coupling vulnerability in different network configurations represents
an interesting area for future work. Experience in the security field indeed teaches
that once a vulnerability is identified, more potent attacks are subsequently discov-
ered (consider, for instance, the history of attacks on WEP (Tews et al., 2007) and
MD5 (Black et al., 2006)). In our case, our simulations for ring topologies indicate
that the presence of a cycle in the topology could reinforce cascading DoS attacks, a
result that warrants further investigations.
6.1.2 Mitigation of attacks due to strong interferers
Several approaches are possible to mitigate cascading DoS attacks. First, one could
enable the RTS/CTS exchange, although this solution has several drawbacks, includ-
ing major performance degradation under normal network operations, as mentioned
in the Chapter 2. Devising a scheme that triggers RTS/CTS under certain circum-
stances (e.g., multiple consecutive packet losses) could be an interesting area for future
research. The second approach is to lower the retry limit. However, this could also
negatively impact performance. Other approaches include using collision-aware rate
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adaptation algorithms, dynamic channel selection, and full-duplex radios. We leave
the investigation and comparison of these mitigation techniques as possible areas for
future work.
6.1.3 Mitigation of attacks due to weak interferers
Besides the existing RTS/CTS solution and shortening packet transmissions (Xin
et al., 2018), we envision that several other approaches, likely more efficient, are
possible. First, additional conditions could be added into the transitions from the
CS/CCA state to the Rx state and back. For instance, when the receiver detects
a valid PLCP preamble and header but determines that the probability of a packet
loss is high (e.g., based on the received signal strength), it could decide to stay in
the CS/CCA state (or move back from the Rx state to the CS/CCA state). Second,
information about the destination could be added into the PLCP header. Instead of
checking the receiver address at the MAC layer after the entire packet was received,
this job could be performed at the physical layer, perhaps at least partially, to prevent
the receiver capture effect.
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